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CHARTERS, COMPACTS, AND TEA PARTIES: THE
DECLINE AND RESURRECTION OF A
DELEGATION VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Edward A. Fallone*

INTRODUCTION
Originalism is widely acknowledged to be the dominant method
1
of constitutional interpretation today. However, recent scholarship
advancing an originalist interpretation of the Constitution reflects
disagreement over whether viewing the Constitution as a form of
contract can provide insight into the original understanding of the
text. For example, Professor Samuel Issacharoff has argued that
one basic feature of originalism is “the underlying idea that a
constitution is indeed a pact, a social contract designed to create
legitimate governing institutions responsive to the political and
2
social divides of a society.” Acceptance of a “contractarian notion of
3
a constitution,” according to Professor Issacharoff, provides insight
4
into the original intentions of the founding generation.
Conversely, Professor Randy Barnett has firmly declared that
5
“constitutions are not contracts.” Professor Barnett argues that
originalists make a mistake when they seek to interpret our
Constitution in a contractual fashion, by seeking to identify the
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to
thank James Nafziger and Michael O’Hear for their helpful suggestions. Some
portions of this Article were presented in an earlier form on September 28,
2007, as part of a conference entitled “America, Human Rights and the World,”
sponsored by the Marquette Human Rights Initiative. I would like to dedicate
this Article to the memory of my father, James E. Fallone.
1. See Brian A. Lichter & David P. Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas
on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 491, 491 (2009). In recent years, it has been
widely stated among legal academics that “we are all originalists now,”
although academics continue to advance alternative forms of originalism. See,
e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10,
11–12 (2007) (reviewing alternative forms of originalism).
2. Samuel Issacharoff, Pragmatic Originalism?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
517, 520 (2009).
3. Id. at 525.
4. Id. at 526.
5. Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009).
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underlying assumptions of the population that is covered by the
6
text. He argues instead that the differences between contracts and
constitutions negate the utility of contract law theory as a means of
ascertaining the underlying assumptions of the parties to the social
7
contract.
However, Professors Issacharoff and Barnett do agree on one
thing. Both professors note that constitutional scholars have thus
far failed to engage in a systematic examination of whether our
understanding of the Constitution is furthered either by embracing
8
or rejecting the notion of the Constitution as contract. Central to
any such examination must be the question of how the founding
generation viewed the United States Constitution.
This Article argues that the Constitution has been understood
at different times to operate as one of two competing conceptions of
contract.
Originally, the founding generation understood the
9
Constitution to operate as a charter of delegated power. However,
over time both the Supreme Court and, more recently, the Bush
administration have advanced the alternative view that the
10
At this
Constitution should be read as if it were a compact.
moment in history, when critics of the Obama administration have
rallied around the cause of limited government—and in particular
have objected to the individual mandates contained in health care
11
reform legislation —it appears that the popular understanding of
the Constitution may be poised to revert toward its original nature
as a charter. Indeed, in many ways the ideological underpinnings of
the Tea Party Movement can be traced to this earlier understanding
of the Constitution.
Part I of this Article discusses the two theories most commonly
used to define the scope of the constitutional domain—theories that
provide that the Constitution should be interpreted as either a
charter of delegated power or as a compact—and explains the
distinctive characteristics of each theory. Part II describes the
Framers’ original understanding of the Constitution as a charter of
delegated powers and the manner in which they understood charters
to circumscribe the exercise of federal power. Part III traces the

6. Id.
7. See id. at 617–26.
8. Barnett notes that “[c]onstitutional scholars have yet to examine
systematically the lessons that can be learned from a close comparison of the
important similarities and equally important differences between written
constitutions and contracts.” Id. at 616. Issacharoff states that the application
of contractual principles to guide the interpretation of the Constitution “is a
relatively underexamined claim in constitutional scholarship.” Issacharoff,
supra note 2, at 520 n.16.
9. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Parts III.C–D.
11. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch et al., Op-Ed., Why the Health-Care Bills Are
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2010, at A11.
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history of how the compact view of the Constitution came to
predominate over the delegation view in more recent expressions of
the scope of the federal government’s power. Finally, the Article
concludes by identifying the reasons for the recent resurgence of the
idea that the Constitution should be read as a charter.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
The task of determining the authority of the federal government
to exercise its power over individual human beings under our
constitutional system has been described as “[d]efining the domain
12
of constitutionalism.” The exact contours of the power granted to
the federal government in certain parts of the text, and the powers
denied to the federal government elsewhere, are ultimately
13
functions of the locus of sovereignty in the constitutional system.
The degree of sovereign power delegated to the federal government
by “the people” at the moment of our nation’s inception, and the
consequent scope of personal liberty that “the people” retained for
themselves, are the fundamental inquiries at the heart of
constitutionalism. The Framers of the Constitution debated this
14
question, and the Tenth Amendment was adopted in an attempt to
15
provide an express resolution of the problem.
Our nation’s constitutional history reflects two competing views
of the nature of the sovereignty possessed by the federal
government. The first view is that the Constitution is a concrete
compact between the federal government and the state
16
governments, with the people of the United States as beneficiaries.
This view conceptualizes the Constitution in standard contractual
terms and places primacy on notions of consent. This approach will
be referred to throughout this Article as the “compact view.”
The second view of sovereignty expressed in our constitutional
history is the view that the Constitution grants no absolute
sovereign powers to the federal government; those powers continue
to be retained by “the people.” Therefore, the only legitimate
12. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1996).
13. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 3 (2002)
(emphasizing the connection between sovereignty, membership, and
governmental power).
14. See JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY 1–10 (2000).
15. See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT,
POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES 39–44 (2006) (reviewing the
drafting and the history of the Tenth Amendment).
16. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL 145–47 (1999) (describing
how James Madison came to embrace a compact theory of the Constitution).
Michael Lind refers to this strand of American political philosophy as
“democratic localism.” See Michael Lind, Introduction, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC,
at xi, xiii (Michael Lind ed., 1997) (“Democratic localists often (though not
always) have claimed that the Constitution established merely a revocable
compact among the states.”); see also generally SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A
NATION 20–25 (1993) (discussing federalism and political theory).
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authority that the federal government possesses is the authority to
exercise the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution’s
17
This view is in accord with the “limited government” and
text.
“structural” approaches that were advanced by some critics of the
18
In order to
Bush administration’s tactics in the “war on terror.”
emphasize the fact that this approach has its roots in the basic
conceptualization of the idea of sovereignty under our Constitution,
this Article will refer to this approach as the “delegation view.”
While the delegation view was ascendant during the years
immediately following our nation’s founding, the compact view made
inroads into the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in cases
involving slavery and immigrants. In particular, immigration cases
have provided the context for the persistent expansion of the
19
The theory of the “unitary
compact view within our borders.
executive,” advanced by proponents of a broad presidential power, is
only the most recent expression of the compact view as the
20
prevailing method of defining the scope of federal power. However,
there are signs that popular opinion is shifting in favor of a return
to the delegation view.
A.

The Constitution as a Compact

The instrumentalist justification for adopting a contractual view
of the Constitution is that it provides a basis for definitively
determining the order of competing claims and interests among the
21
The
people, the state governments, and the federal government.
Constitution itself provides the textual evidence of the original
bargain by which the parties to the agreement sought to further
their interests. The primary benefits to be gained by reading the
Constitution as a compact flow from the procedural method by
which conflicting claims are resolved via reference to the textual
22
evidence of the original bargain. These benefits are stability and
objectivity in connection with the interpretation of the content of the
Constitution.
The difficulty with the compact view of the Constitution, on a

17. This strand of American political philosophy is sometimes called
“democratic nationalism” or “Hamiltonianism.” See Lind, supra note 16, at xii–
xiii.
18. President Bush used the phrase “war on terror” when he addressed a
joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE
PERCENT DOCTRINE 19 (2006). The Obama administration has consciously
avoided using the phrase “war on terror,” instead emphasizing that the United
States was (and remains) at war with al-Qaeda. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War
over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010 (Magazine), at 30, 33.
19. See infra notes 163–80 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.D.
21. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (1995).
22. See id.
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conceptual basis, is in identifying the parties to the contract.
Possible alternatives are to regard the Constitution as a contract
among the states, as a contract among the persons alive during
ratification, or as a social contract that binds the current members
23
The view that the Constitution should be
of our society.
interpreted as a compact among the several states was influential
24
early in our nation’s history, and that view still has its adherents,
but the idea is rarely advanced among academics today. Instead,
contemporary constitutional theory approaches the idea of a
25
constitutional compact through the lens of the social contract.
The concept of membership is an obvious starting point for
defining the boundaries of the social contract. Who are “the people”
who can assert the protection of that document’s provisions? A
process that identifies a particular community as comprising “the
people” for constitutional purposes will simultaneously define all
26
residual human beings left out of that community as “outsiders.”
Logically, the terms of the “constitutional bargain” can only apply to
those who are part of the deal.
In his 1996 book, Strangers to the Constitution, Professor
Gerald Neuman offered four separate approaches toward
conceptualizing the Constitution in order to define its reach:
universalism, membership, mutuality of obligation, and global due
27
process. The first approach, “universalism,” treats all people in all
28
The
places as persons protected by the text of the Constitution.
second approach, which Neuman calls “membership,” uses concepts
of social contract to define a subset of individuals both within and
29
without our borders who receive constitutional protection.
Neuman’s third approach is “mutuality of obligation,” which equates
the reach of the Constitution to the sphere within which
30
nonresidents are obligated to obey United States municipal law.
This model denies constitutional rights to persons outside of our

23. Id. at 57–62.
24. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 105 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Paul Lermack, The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It
Must Be a Contract . . . Right? A Critique of Originalism as Interpretive
Method, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1429–33 (2007). But see SANFORD
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 111–14 (1988) (arguing that the Constitution
should be read as a covenant rather than in purely contractual terms).
26. See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
195, 207 (2000) (“The political dimension of citizenship . . . [is] tempered by an
exclusionary principle that certain types of political activity . . . [are] limited to
those who meet the standards of full membership in the polity . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
27. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 4–8.
28. Id. at 5–6.
29. Id. at 6–7.
30. Id. at 7–8.

W05_FALLONE

1072

10/18/2010 11:45:59 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

31

borders who are not bound to respect our laws. Finally, Neuman
32
identifies a fourth approach that he calls “global due process.”
Under this model, judges perform a case-by-case inquiry in order to
determine the reach of the Constitution. In so doing, judges balance
the potential application of constitutional protections to noncitizens
outside of our borders against government interests that counsel
33
against recognizing such protections.
While applauding the usefulness of Neuman’s analysis and his
historical insights, critics have pointed out that, ultimately, the
universalism, mutuality of obligation, and global due process
34
approaches are difficult to distinguish from each other. Indeed, it
appears that all four of Neuman’s separately identified approaches
35
ultimately rely on a “social contract” model of the Constitution.
That is, each of his approaches is fundamentally premised on the
idea that the Constitution embodies a contractual set of reciprocal
obligations between identifiable individual and governmental actors.
Therefore, defining membership—separating those individuals
who are protected by the Constitution’s terms from those who are
not—becomes the core focus under any compact-based reading of the
Constitution. Difficulty arises, however, because the original text of
the Constitution does not include any definition of membership. The
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment helps to clarify the
situation somewhat, insofar as it clearly identifies a category of
individuals who cannot be denied membership (natural persons born
36
However, the Fourteenth
within the territorial United States).
Amendment does not address the question of whether membership
in the social contract can be extended to include natural persons
born outside of the United States. Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not speak to whether corporations and other
juridical “persons” might be included as members of the social
37
Finally, the Fourteenth
compact along with natural persons.

31. Id. at 7.
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law? Citizens, Aliens,
and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1577–79 (1997) (reviewing
NEUMAN, supra note 12).
35. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 9–13 (describing the “social contract”
tradition that illuminates his four interpretive models); see also Akash R. Desai,
Note, How We Should Think About the Constitutional Status of the Suspected
Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Examining Theories that Interpret the
Constitution’s Scope, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1579, 1604–09 (2003)
(discussing Neuman’s “membership” and “mutuality of obligation” approaches
as variants of social contract theory).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929–30
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing the
idea that the original understanding of free speech protected by the First
Amendment extends to corporations).
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Amendment does not specify which branch of the federal
government—the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court—
possesses the ultimate authority to make determinations of
membership status under the Constitution.
B.

The Constitution as a Charter of Delegated Powers

A more promising alternative to the compact view is the
argument that the Constitution should be conceptualized as a
document that creates a government of limited delegated powers.
38
Sometimes called a “limited government” approach, sometimes
39
identified as a “structural” approach, and alluded to by Neuman as
40
a type of “organic” utilitarianism, this approach to interpreting the
Constitution posits that the United States government simply does
41
Therefore, a
not possess the power to act in certain situations.
delegation approach conceptualizes the reach of the text in a way
that is not dependent on any definition of the social contract.
The delegation view provides a structural approach to
interpreting the reach of the Constitution. This approach focuses on
the scope of power delegated to the federal government in order to
define limitations on the exercise of federal authority that apply
42
even against nonmembers. The result is an understanding of the
scope of federal government power that differs from the result
obtained under contractually derived definitions of “membership.”
The “delegation view” starts with the proposition that the
federal government is the creation of the Constitution and that its
sovereign power is limited. As an artificially created entity, the
federal government is incapable of possessing any power or
authority that is not granted to it by our nation’s foundational
43
Under this view of the nature of federal power, the
document.
government’s ability to perform an act does not depend on the
identity of the individual who is the subject of government action.
Neither a citizen nor a noncitizen can be subjected to any exercise of
44
Therefore, it is
government power that is an ultra vires act.
38. See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government
Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 641
(2007); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2035 n.89 (2005).
39. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1687, 1697–1703 (2004); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the
Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1994).
40. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 6.
41. Id.
42. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) (“This
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now
universally admitted.”).
44. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901) (noting the existence of
constitutional prohibitions that “go to the very root of the power of Congress to
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unnecessary to classify an individual as a member or a nonmember
prior to evaluating the legitimacy of the government action directed
towards that individual.
A recognition that the primary objective of the Constitution is to
limit the power of government, rather than to identify and protect a
sphere of individual rights, has important implications. First, this
recognition suggests that a general distrust of centralized power is
45
Second, this
an integral part of the constitutional design.
recognition elevates the principles of federalism and separation of
powers to the level of basic constitutional commands, even though
these principles are not explicitly referenced by the text of the
46
While federalism and separation of powers
Constitution.
principles are often invoked by critics of an overreaching Congress,
it is important to note that the allocation of powers to Congress
under Article I of the Constitution serves as a limitation on the
powers exercised by the executive branch as much as it does a
47
delegation of authority to the federal legislature.
C.

Compact and Delegation Contrasted

The predominant feature of the compact view is that, with the
exception of the express guarantees of specified rights contained in
the text, individual persons do not function as parties to the
foundational compact between the federal government and the
states. Instead, the interests of individuals are promoted in the
constitutional system in two indirect ways.
First, individual
interests are preserved via the proxy of maintaining a sufficient
level of state government power to serve as a counterweight to the
48
federal government. Second, individual interests are protected by
a strict policing of the separation of powers between the three
49
federal branches.
In regards to those individual rights guaranteed in the text of
act at all, irrespective of time or place”). “[W]hen the Constitution declares that
‘no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,’ and that ‘no title of
nobility shall be granted by the United States,’ it goes to the competency of
Congress to pass a bill of that description.” Id.
45. See Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of Rights as
Limited Government Provisions, 62 SMU L. REV. 1745, 1755 (2009) (“The
primary motivation underlying the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers was the framers’ fear of centralized power.”).
46. Id. at 1754–55.
47. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 259, 304–07 (2009).
48. See WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 105–06 (1996).
49. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as
well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be
exercised. The citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of the exercise of
governmental power.”).
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the Constitution, the fundamental characteristic of the compact
view is that it limits the possession of these rights to those persons
who are members of the social contract. Only members of the
community who are parties to the contract are allowed to claim the
50
As a result,
individual rights that the Constitution guarantees.
the legitimacy of government action under the Constitution depends
entirely upon whether a member of the political community is
aggrieved. Contracts do not create any rights for nonparties, and
under a compact view of the Constitution the guarantees of
individual rights contained in the text do not apply to “outsiders” to
the community. The Constitution is read to impose a form of privity
51
of contract.
This social contract view of the Constitution relies on
membership models that incorporate certain assumptions. All such
models reveal a hesitancy to define membership in ways that allow
aliens to impose their membership status on the United States
52
without the consent of our government. In addition, models that
recognize membership status for noncitizens for some purposes beg
the question of whether noncitizens should be granted membership
status for all purposes. For example, acknowledging due process
rights for Guantanamo Bay detainees under the Constitution raises
the question of whether the detainees also possess First Amendment
53
Membership implies an all-or-nothing proposition, not
rights.
gradations of rights.
Therefore, the compact view assumes that the consent of the
government is necessary before membership can be asserted, and
that there are no gradations of rights among the members of the
54
social contract. However, these assumptions are derived from the
asserted contractual nature of the Constitution and not from any
source in the text of the document itself. In contrast, the delegation
view does not require us to make the assumption that government
consent is necessary before individuals born outside of the United
States can make constitutional claims. Similarly, the delegation
view does not require us to conclude that by recognizing that the
Constitution confers certain rights on an individual we are
necessarily determining that the individual possesses the full range
of individual liberties guaranteed by the text.
The reason for this distinction arises from the manner in which
individuals enforce constitutional rights. The primary purpose of
the Constitution is to protect “the people” in the enjoyment of their
50. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT 36–40 (1985) (reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of a system
of government built around political membership).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 37.
53. See id. at 40 (noting that a community’s “humanitarian values . . . may
justify certain sorts of rights and assistance to aliens”).
54. See id. at 36–40.
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55

lives. This protection offered by the constitutional text takes two
distinct forms. An individual plays “offense” with the text when
they use the Constitution to assert the freedom to exercise an
identifiable group of specified or implied individual rights without
56
government interference. So, for example, persons governed by the
Constitution might claim the right to engage in free speech or to
make reproductive decisions without being subjected to excessive
governmental restrictions.
However, the Constitution also provides a second type of
protection to individuals. The fact that the text of the Constitution
defines and constrains the scope of governmental authority also
allows individuals to assert the existence of structural boundaries
57
Structural
that cabin the federal government’s ability to act.
boundaries act as chains that restrain the free exercise of power by
each of the three branches of the federal government. Individuals
play “defense” with the text when they argue that the government
lacks the power to take certain actions, even in situations in which
the Constitution does not expressly guarantee any identifiable right
58
that the government is accused of infringing.
It is uncontroversial to assert that “the people” enjoy the first
kind of protection described above and that “outsiders” cannot play
offense with the Constitution. For example, the right of free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution does not reach around the world. It
is also uniformly accepted that “the people” can use the structural
boundaries of the text to play defense. The doctrines of separation
of powers and federalism have long been asserted by individuals as
a means of confining the power of the federal government within
59
designated bounds.
55. In addition to forming “a more perfect Union” between the states, the
Preamble to the Constitution lists the document’s goals as establishing
“Justice,” ensuring “domestic Tranquility,” providing for “common defence,”
promoting “general Welfare,” and securing “the Blessings of Liberty.” U.S.
CONST. pmbl.; accord James Madison, Speech to Congress, Adding a Bill of
Rights to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 164, 167 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006) (“[G]overnment is instituted and
ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”).
57. See Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5–10 (2009).
58. For example, a person aggrieved by an act of Congress need not
challenge that act by pointing to an individual right guaranteed by the
constitutional text that the act violates. She can merely argue that neither the
Interstate Commerce Clause nor any other delegation of authority to Congress
permits Congress to legislate on the act’s subject matter. To give a concrete
example, some opponents of health care reform legislation charge that Congress
lacks the power under the Constitution to compel private individuals to
purchase health insurance. See, e.g., Hatch et al., supra note 11, at A11.
59. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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Controversy arises, however, when one argues that “outsiders”
to the Constitution possess the same ability to protect themselves
defensively by asserting the existence of structural boundaries that
circumscribe governmental power that is possessed by constitutional
insiders. In order to accept this proposition, it is necessary to reject
the use of membership as a means of defining the reach of the
Constitution. If the Constitution does not permit the federal
government to exercise any power—either domestically or
extraterritorially—that has not been affirmatively granted to it
under the Constitution, then even those persons identified as
“outsiders” must be permitted to challenge our government’s actions
as unlawful. This logic leads us to the conclusion that the power of
the federal government must be subject to the check of judicial
review without regard either to where that power is exercised or to
the identity of the target of the power. Membership status is
rendered irrelevant under the delegation view.
II. DELEGATION AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
The delegation view of the Constitution is a necessary
consequence of the very nature of sovereignty as understood by the
Framers and embodied in the text. The federal government created
by the Constitution was not endowed with the limitless and absolute
60
The people created a sovereign
sovereign powers of a monarch.
entity to rule over them, but it was a federal sovereign with limited
purposes and carefully circumscribed powers. This realm of federal
sovereignty coexists with the sovereignty of the states and the
original sovereignty of the people. Under the delegation view, the
federal sovereignty created by the Constitution has four
characteristics: (1) the document defining the relationship between
the people and the federal government is properly understood as a
charter, not a compact; (2) the federal government (including the
executive branch) possesses only those powers delegated to it; (3) the
people retain their ultimate sovereignty; and (4) the sovereignty of
the people is active, ongoing, and cannot be severed from the people.
A.

The Constitution Is a Charter, Not a Compact

The scope of the sovereignty of the federal government is
dictated by the fact that the Constitution is a charter and not a
compact. In this regard, the Constitution differs from the Articles of
Confederation (“Articles”), adopted upon our nation’s independence
from Great Britain. The Articles created a federal government with
61
Under the
a structure that was purely contractual in nature.
Articles, each of the newly independent colonies retained its status
60. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
61. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25–26
(2005) (explaining the consent-based nature of the Articles of Confederation).
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as a separate sovereign.
The Articles joined these thirteen
sovereigns in the same way that a treaty might bind sovereign
nations. Although that document bound the states to act in a
uniform manner on certain specified topics of mutual interest
(notably foreign affairs), the vision of the Articles failed in practice
because the obligations that it placed on the individual states were
63
ultimately unenforceable.
In contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the U.S.
Constitution is not a compact among independent sovereign states.
The architects of the new national government, in drafting the
Constitution, produced a document that reflected novel ideas about
the proper dividing line between the power of a federal government
and the liberty of individuals—ideas that were simply not relevant
64
The intent of the
to a compact between state governments.
Constitution as expressed initially in the “Virginia Plan,” which
served as the basis for the earliest debates at the Convention, was to
establish a federal government that operated directly on the people,
65
without the states as intermediaries.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 28 (“Although on paper the Congress under the Articles enjoyed
some important powers, it had no effective means of carrying them out.”). Not
all of the founders viewed the structure of the Articles as unsalvageable. For
example, Thomas Jefferson did not concede the inability of the national
Congress to enforce compliance on the part of the states under the Articles, as
he used language that recognized the contractual nature of the relationship at
issue: “It has been so often said, as to be generally believed, that Congress have
no power by the [Articles of Confederation] to enforce anything, e.g.,
contributions of money. It was not necessary to give them that power expressly;
they have it by the law of nature. When two parties make a compact, there
results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it.” 2 DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 161 (1951)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787)).
64. The search for the “original meaning” of any particular provision in the
United States Constitution is frustrated by both inconsistent evidence and the
impossibility of ascribing a single intention to what was ultimately a corporate
act. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 6 (1996). The people who debated
the Constitution, and who voted for or against its adoption, had individual and
varied interpretations of the document. The ultimate text is the result of
countless compromises among these views. Benjamin Franklin described the
drafting process as follows:
[W]e must not expect, that a new government may be formed, as a
game of chess may be played, by a skilful [sic] hand, without a fault.
The players of our game are so many, their ideas so different, their
prejudices so strong and so various, and their particular interests,
independent of the general, seeming so opposite, that not a move can
be made that is not contested; the numerous objections confound the
understanding; the wisest must agree to some unreasonable things,
that reasonable ones of more consequence be obtained; and thus
chance has its share in many of the determinations . . . .
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Dupont de Nemours (June 9, 1788), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 658, 659 (Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907).
65. The initial debates at the Constitutional Convention found the
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The distinction between charters and compacts was well
66
understood at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. The use of
the word “charter” indicated that a free and sovereign people had
created a national government through the act of granting it
67
power. James Madison contrasted the American experience to that
of earlier parliamentary bodies that had been created by European
monarchies, which Madison described pejoratively as “charters of
participants divided into two camps. Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton all argued
that the Constitution should reflect the key component of the “Virginia Plan,”
which was a national legislature that directly reflected the interests of
individuals and that allowed majorities of individuals to express their will on
matters of national concern without regard to state boundaries. See RAKOVE,
supra note 64, at 60–61. Opponents of the Virginia Plan argued that one
primary component of any new Constitution had to be a limit on the national
legislature that protected groupings of states from having to bend to the
national will on issues like slavery. See id. at 66–68. The division between
these two camps expressed itself in the debate over how to apportion seats in
the Senate. Ultimately, “the framers could not avoid treating the states as
constituent elements of the polity.” Id. at 78. A compromise was brokered that
resulted in a Constitution that combines aspects of a charter delegating
authority, within specified limits, to the federal government, with a compact
between the larger and smaller states, intended to preserve the ability of the
latter to pursue their own interests and to maintain the institution of slavery.
See id. at 77–79. The hybrid nature of the Constitution was reflected during
the debate on one of the early iterations of this compromise. When discussing
the combination of proportional representation based on population in the
House with equal representation among the states in the Senate, Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut described the scheme as “partly national; partly
federal.” Id. at 68.
66. James Madison, for one, frequently used the word “charter” to describe
the scope of the power that would be exercised by the new federal government.
Admittedly, Madison also employed the language of “compact” as a means of
explaining the system of government set forth in the text. See, e.g., Letter from
James Madison to Spencer Roane (June 29, 1821), in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT 461, 461–62 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1965) (“Our Governmental
System is established by a compact, not between the Government of the
[United] States, and the State Governments; but between the States, as
sovereign communities, stipulating each with the others, a surrender of certain
portions, of their respective authorities, to be exercised by a Common Govt. and
a reservation, for their own exercise, of all their other Authorities.”). The
hybrid system of national government established by the Constitution was
unprecedented in human history, and the Framers often struggled as they
attempted to explain its precise characteristics to the general public.
67. In an 1830 letter to Andrew Stevenson, Madison wrote: “[T]he
Government holds its powers by a charter granted to it by the people . . . .
Hitherto charters have been written grants of privileges by Governments to the
people. Here they are written grants of power by the people to their
Governments.” Letter from James Madison to A. Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in
THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 478, 479. Similarly, in an
article published in the National Gazette dated January 19, 1792, Madison
described the governments created by the American and French Revolutions as
“charters of power granted by liberty.” James Madison, Charters: Powers and
Liberty, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1792, reprinted in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 508, 508 [hereinafter Madison, Charters].
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liberty . . . granted by power.”
The American experience was
different, because our federal and state governments arise from
“great charters, derived not from the usurped power of kings, but
69
from the legitimate authority of the people.” In America, we do not
enjoy our liberties at the whim of a monarch.
In 1789, the word “charter” referred to a particular type of
contractual relationship with its own distinctive features. A charter
was a foundational document that transferred power to an artificial
entity, such as a municipal government, a university, or a
70
corporation. However, a charter was not a perpetual or complete
transfer of power away from the establishing body, and the artificial
entity remained permanently subordinate to the body that created
71
it. Interpreting the Constitution under a delegation view faithfully
68. Madison, Charters, supra note 67, at 508.
69. Id. at 509.
70. During the colonial era, the word “charter” had a very strong
connotation that invoked collective entities serving a public purpose. For
example, colonial legislatures often used charters to establish units of local
government and to organize religious congregations. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 79 (2005). Charters
were also used during the colonial period to establish companies that were
antecedents to our modern private corporations, but even then the majority of
these companies had a strong public-service component. SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 38 (1996). The
universe of early American corporations was typically comprised of “banks,
insurance companies, universities, and companies engaged in constructing
turnpikes, bridges and canals.” PRESSER, supra, at 78. Therefore, even in the
case of private companies, the use of charters in the colonial era was associated
with entities that served a public purpose and functioned much like today’s
“public utilities.” Id.; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 949 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Those few corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant
of a special legislative charter.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 15
(2004) (“[A]lmost all of the business enterprises incorporated here in the
formative generation starting in the 1780’s were chartered for activities of some
community interest . . . .”). The development of modern corporate law in
America came after the Revolution, as the business functions of corporations
began to evolve away from the quasi-public objectives of government, such as
regulating trade, and instead began to increasingly reflect private objectives.
BOWMAN, supra, at 40–41; see also NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 246–48.
71. This traditional understanding of the law of contract was at issue in the
dispute between the trustees of Dartmouth College, who claimed that the terms
of the school’s charter were constitutionally protected from subsequent
amendment, and the New Hampshire legislature, who claimed the authority to
recall powers previously granted under the charter. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Thomas Jefferson rejected the idea
that the legislature lacked the power to alter the charter, calling it equivalent
to the idea “that the earth belongs to the dead, and not to the living.” Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Plumer (July 21, 1816), reprinted in WILLIAM
PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 440, 441 (A.P. Peabody ed., 1857). In the
Dartmouth case, the Supreme Court decided the issue in favor of the trustees,
thereby revolutionizing the American law of contract and making possible the
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72

Executive Power Is Limited to Delegated Powers

The delegation view also interprets the Constitution as limiting
the sovereign authority of the legislative and executive branches to
73
The text enumerates the
the exercise of delegated powers.
specified powers that a sovereign people have delegated to their
government and sets signposts beyond which the government has no
74
James Madison was an advocate for a strong
authority to act.
federal government during the ratification debates, but even he
insisted that the powers exercised by that government must “stay
75
within whatever limits have been clearly agreed upon.”
In particular, the idea of delegated powers is antithetical to the
existence of any “inherent” sovereign power on the part of the
federal government beyond the scope of the grant contained in the
76
James Madison anticipated the argument that a charter’s
text.
delegation of power to the federal government might be interpreted
expansively to include not only the powers specified in the text but
also an inherent power of government to do all that is necessary for
77
He argued that the care with which the
its own preservation.
drafters of the constitutional text defined the delegated powers of
the federal government belied any argument that the government
possessed powers in excess of those delegated. Therefore, a power
that is not delegated by the Constitution is the same as a power that
78
It makes no difference
is withheld from the federal government.
rise of modern corporations. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 712–
13.
72. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1432–35 (1987).
73. Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 286
(2008).
74. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 188 (1999) (“In explaining the
nature of constitutional interpretation, Madison noted that the overarching
principle was that the grant of power to the new federal government was
intended to be limited: ‘It is not a general grant, out of which particular powers
are excepted; it is a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in
other hands.’”).
75. READ, supra note 14, at 13.
76. For example, James Madison wrote: “[I]t is evident that the objects for
which the Constitution was formed were deemed attainable only by a particular
enumeration and specification of each power granted to the Federal
Government; reserving all others to the people, or to the States.” James
Madison, The Alien and Sedition Acts: Address of the General Assembly to the
People of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799), in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 513, 514.
77. See READ, supra note 14, at 12 (“What Madison argued against . . . was
the use of implied powers in a way that allowed the indefinite expansion of
governmental power.”).
78. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 12, 1800), in
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790–1802, at 345, 347 (Gaillard Hunt ed.
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whether the advocates of expansive powers label them as inherent,
79
implied, or expedient.
Perhaps the most significant limitation that the Constitution
places on the federal government is contained in the Supremacy
Clause. The Constitution itself, the law of nations, and acts of
Congress passed pursuant to its delegated power are declared the
80
This provision does more than enforce
supreme law of the land.
the precedence of federal sources of law over law that originates in
the states. It also denies the three federal branches of government
the power to contravene either the Constitution or international
81
law.
Madison did not fear a powerful executive branch simply
because of the quantum of authority that it possessed. Rather, what
he most feared about executive authority was its potential to claim
to possess any power deemed necessary to defend the nation. “For
Madison the possibility of reconciling the power of government and
the liberty of citizens depends above all upon the existence of clear
boundaries to governmental power publicly agreed upon by an
enduring majority of the people. . . . [O]nce they [are] agreed upon,
82
Interpreting the
liberty is threatened if they are trespassed.”
Constitution under a delegation view precludes the possibility that
the executive branch will exceed the limited scope of governmental
power that Madison sought desperately to demarcate.
C.

The People Retain Absolute Sovereignty

The delegation view presupposes that the people retain the
83
It therefore
ultimate authority under our constitutional system.
stands in contrast to theories of executive power that posit the
existence of an inherent and unbounded authority in the field of
84
foreign affairs, such as the theory of the “unitary executive.” The
recognition that the people are the source of all sovereign authority
is incompatible with the assertion that the executive branch
possesses any powers derived external to the constitutional text.
Proponents of the theory of the unitary executive often rely on
the writings of Alexander Hamilton to provide an originalist
85
Hamilton argued that a unitary
justification for their views.
federal government, rather than a confederation of states, was best
86
He also argued that the
suited to defend the nation as a whole.
1906).
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
81. Id.
82. READ, supra note 14, at 28.
83. See Amar, supra note 72, at 1435–36.
84. See infra Part III.D.
85. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 119–20 (2006).
86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 148, 148–50 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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powers of the executive branch of the federal government should be
lodged in the hands of one individual rather than in a multiperson
council so that those powers could be exercised with energy in the
87
face of exigencies. From these two propositions, supporters of the
theory of the unitary executive arrive at the conclusion that
Hamilton supported an executive branch with almost unbridled
88
power when it acted in the realm of national security.
There is a difference between asserting a federal locus for the
power of the national defense, on the one hand, and locating that
power exclusively in the hands of the federal government’s executive
branch on the other.
There is also a difference between a
constitutional text that scrupulously avoids any role for the states in
the determination of national security measures, on the one hand,
and a text that places no structural limits at all on the means that
the executive branch uses to advance national security, on the other.
In neither case does the acceptance of the first premise necessarily
lead to the second.
In fact, Alexander Hamilton believed that the constitutional
text did place limits on the exercise of federal power, whether in the
realm of national security or otherwise. His writings are consistent
with the delegation view of the Constitution, albeit in a less direct
way than Madison’s view. For example, like Madison, Hamilton
argued that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary in the original text
because the federal government created by the Constitution already
lacked the delegated power to take actions that infringe on
89
individual liberties. Hamilton did not consider a bill of rights to be
necessary because the Constitution expresses a system under which
90
the sovereign people retain the ultimate power.
87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 86, at 421, 422–24 (Alexander
Hamilton).
88. See YOO, supra note 85, at 119–20 (“The Framers . . . created an
executive with its own independent powers to manage foreign affairs and
address emergencies which, almost by definition, cannot be addressed by
existing laws.”).
89. Hamilton asked in The Federalist No. 84: “[W]hy declare that things
shall not be done which there is no power to do?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 94, supra
note 86, at 509, 513 (Alexander Hamilton). This question assumes a scope of
federal sovereignty along the lines of the ultra vires doctrine: the federal
government is the creation of the people and therefore cannot possess more
powers than are granted to it by its creator. See also Madison, supra note 55.
90. See Amar, supra note 72, at 1429 (referring to the preexisting
sovereignty of “the people” as one of the “first principles” of the Constitution).
In The Federalist No. 84, Hamilton describes the nature of a bill of rights in the
general sense as being a form of reservation of rights by the people against the
otherwise absolute sovereignty of the king (using the Magna Carta, the Petition
of Right under the reign of Charles the First, and the Declaration of Right
presented to the Prince of Orange in 1688 as examples of typical “bills of
rights”). THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 86, at 509, 512 (Alexander
Hamilton). Hamilton argued that a constitution is a fundamentally different
text from a bill of rights, because under a constitution the people retain their
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The main distinction between the views of Madison and
Hamilton in regards to delegated power may be a matter of timing.
Madison felt that the outer limits of federal government power were
permanently set by the understanding of the people at the time that
91
Those boundaries could not be
the Constitution was ratified.
expanded short of a constitutional amendment. Hamilton seems to
have believed that these limits could be loosened or lifted through
precipitous action by the federal government, explained and
defended to the public, so long as the public demonstrated its
92
Hamilton’s conception of
approval of the new boundaries.
sovereignty allowed for the possibility that later generations of
Americans might approve of a stronger national government than
was originally envisioned if they were persuaded that the extra
authority was merited, without the need to resort to a constitutional
93
Significantly, however, while he seemed to believe
amendment.
that the people could consent to an expansion of federal sovereignty
beyond its original confines, Hamilton did not argue that the
executive branch possessed the power to expand its authority on a
unilateral basis.
Hamilton’s writings illuminate the manner in which delegated
authority is a fundamental corollary of the very nature of

ultimate sovereignty. Id. (“[Under a constitution], in strictness, the people
surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of
particular reservations . . . .”). Therefore, he argued, the U.S. Constitution as
originally drafted had no need for a bill of rights. But see READ, supra note 14,
at 75 (arguing that Hamilton did not accept the concept of an active sovereignty
of the people other than in some “nebulous sense”).
91. READ, supra note 14, at 58.
92. Id. at 85–86.
93. Id. Hamilton does not appear to have considered the consequences if
the federal government asserted increased powers only to find them rejected by
the public. He seems to anticipate a process that redraws the lines of
sovereignty through the government’s instigation of a constitutional crisis. See
id. at 86. Hamilton’s later proposal to charter a national bank and his adoption
of the principle that even a federal government limited in its ends could employ
tremendous discretion in choosing the appropriate means to achieve those ends
later led to a philosophical split with Madison. The result was that Madison
came to align himself with the Anti-Federalists in opposition to the National
Bank. However, this split between Madison and Hamilton was not due to
Madison changing his position on the nature of sovereignty. Rather, Madison
opposed Hamilton’s proposed bank because he saw it as inconsistent with
original assumptions concerning the proper ends for which the federal power
would be used. See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 187–91 (explaining the
constitutional conflict over the chartering of a national bank). Madison was
convinced that it had been settled at the time of ratification that the federal
government lacked the power to charter a national bank. READ, supra note 14,
at 29; see also NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 104 (“Among those nationalists who
disagreed with Hamilton’s version of nationalism was Madison himself.”). For
his part, Hamilton believed that, so long as the general public accepted the
national bank as a proper means to pursue legitimate federal ends, the bank
was constitutional.
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sovereignty. If the people are truly sovereign in the United States,
then the government created by the people cannot possess more
94
power than do the people. To speak of the “inherent” powers of the
executive branch in the realm of foreign affairs is to deny the
ultimate sovereignty of the people over the exercise of foreign
affairs. Only by reading the Constitution as a compact can we
conclude that the people have severed all ties to their sovereignty
and surrendered it to the federal government.
D.

Popular Sovereignty Cannot Be Severed from the People

The use of the delegation view in order to police the scope of the
sovereign power delegated to the federal government is consistent
with the Constitution’s overall conception of popular sovereignty.
James Wilson, whose arguments were influential during the debate
over ratification, believed that a national body of “the people”
95
predated the creation of both the state and federal governments.
Subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution, “the people” in a
national sense remain superior to every level of government.
Therefore, the Constitution reflects a concept of popular sovereignty
96
The delegation view
that cannot be severed from the people.
94. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton’s
delegation view, under which the sovereign people retain the ultimate power).
95. See James Wilson, Speech Before the Ratifying Convention of
Pennsylvania (Nov. 26, 1787), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 525, 543
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (“The truth is, that, in our governments, the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.”); see also
READ, supra note 14, at 17 (“Wilson’s response to the complications of
federalism was to assert the existence of a single, national sovereign people
standing above all authority conflicts.”).
96. Fundamentally, Wilson rejected the idea that “the people” could ever
completely delegate away their sovereign powers to any governmental unit.
MOORE, supra note 48, at 109. Instead, Wilson believed that the Constitution
preserved separate and ongoing realms of power for the states, for the federal
government, and for the people, with the people retaining both ultimate
sovereignty and the ability to recall to themselves any delegated power as they
saw fit. Id. at 107–09. “He never wavered from his faith that there existed in
the United States a single, national sovereign people capable of distributing
power between national government and state governments while remaining
superior to both.” READ, supra note 14, at 89. Wilson argued that the state
governments that had been adopted upon independence received a different
form of delegated authority from the type of delegated authority that the federal
government received. The state governments received a delegation of all
governmental authority subject to express reservations by the people intended
to preserve individual liberties. MOORE, supra note 48, at 107–08. Under the
U.S. Constitution, in contrast, the people delegated only an express authority to
the federal government, leaving all residual sovereignty in the hands of either
the states or private individuals (depending on whether the relevant state
constitution allocated that residual power to the state government or preserved
it as a part of individual liberty). Id. Under Wilson’s constitutional design,
therefore, each of the three sovereigns—the newly created federal government,
the preexisting states, and a national community of “the people”—comprised
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reflects this understanding of the fundamental nature of the
sovereignty possessed by the people.
97
The case of Schneiderman v. United States demonstrates how
the residual sovereignty of the people continues to be preserved from
government encroachment. The federal government sought to
revoke Mr. Schneiderman’s citizenship on the grounds that his
membership in the Communist Party rendered it impossible for him
to truthfully claim an “attachment to the principles of the
Constitution,” as required under the relevant naturalization
98
statute. A deeply divided Supreme Court held that membership in
the Communist Party was not incompatible with the principles of
the Constitution, despite the fact that the Communist Party
platform called for the communal ownership of property and for
restructuring the federal government in order to eliminate both the
99
In dissent, Chief Justice Stone
Senate and the Supreme Court.
claimed that the majority was denying the existence of any
100
unchangeable principles in the Constitution.
Traditionally, Schneiderman has been interpreted through the
lens of individual rights. Under this interpretation, the case stands
101
as an affirmation of Mr. Schneiderman’s First Amendment rights.
However, the case is better understood as a rebuke of the idea that
the grant of sovereignty to the federal government in the
Constitution is a static one. The dissent views the Constitution as a
binding contract, and the current structure of the federal
government as reflecting a bargain that cannot be altered. The

distinct actors that contemporaneously exercised independent authority in a
three part confederation. Id. at 107 (“[Wilson] presumed, in short, that powers
of the United States government, powers reserved to the respective states, and
some of the people’s rights and powers were mutually exclusive normative
categories.”). A system in which three actors expressed different forms of
sovereignty would not be feasible if the federal government possessed absolute
sovereignty, and therefore Wilson refused to view the Constitution
simplistically as a compact whereby “the people” granted their sovereignty to
the federal government. Nor did Wilson view the Constitution as a compact
between sovereign states in which the states agreed to cede authority to a
federal government. Instead, Wilson treated the powers exercisable by the
federal government under the Constitution “as analogous to powers of attorney
or powers of trust, not irrevocable transfers or contractual commitments.” Id.
at 110. Wilson’s ideas influenced many early Federalists, including Supreme
Court Justice John Marshall. See Michael Lind, Preface to James Wilson,
Popular Sovereignty and the Constitution, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note
16, at 85, 85; NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 173–74.
97. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
98. Id. at 121 & n.2.
99. Id. at 145–47, 157–61.
100. Id. at 181 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (claiming such principles include
“protection of civil rights and of life, liberty and property, the principle of
representative government, and the principle that constitutional laws are not to
be broken down by planned disobedience”).
101. See LEVINSON, supra note 25, at 148.
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majority, in contrast, affirms the existence of a sovereign power of
the people to choose a new structure for the federal government that
differs significantly from the original structure embodied in the text.
The majority opinion rejects any interpretation of the naturalization
statute that operates to limit the people’s prerogative to exercise its
sovereign power in the future.
Therefore, it is incompatible with the Framers’ original intent to
read the Constitution as a device that completely severs sovereignty
from the people and transfers it to the federal government, whether
it be a wholesale transfer or one limited to the authority to conduct
foreign affairs. Instead, the text of the Constitution defines an
ongoing relationship among the states, the federal government, and
the people. None of these three sovereign entities possesses any
authority independent of the boundaries of that relationship.
Interpreting the Constitution under a delegation view preserves this
unique tripartite relationship.
E.

The Delegation View Post-Ratification

The legitimacy of the delegation view is further confirmed by
events following the ratification of the Constitution. The primary
architects of the Constitution expressed their opposition to the view
that the federal government possesses the whole of sovereignty as
the result of a contractual devise, whether originating from “the
102
Instead, the Framers had
people” or from the states.
conceptualized the relationship between the people and the federal
government along the lines of a clearly defined charter—setting
forth specific purposes and modes of operation for the exercise of
governmental functions. The founding generation believed that the
103
constitutional text as drafted was sufficiently clear and precise to
accurately reflect their underlying assumptions concerning the
104
This original understanding of
proper scope of federal authority.
102. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 930 (1985). Powell denies that the Framers had any
intent to create a compact or contract when they drafted the Constitution, citing
the explanations of the Framers during the debate over ratification and
emphasizing the text’s failure to include any reference to either a “compact” or
to the states as contracting parties. Id. at 929–30.
103. The usage of ambiguous language in the Constitution does not require
the reader to acquiesce in “an indefinitely expansive rule of construction.”
READ, supra note 14, at 39. As explained by historian James Read, “There is a
difference between conceding that some powers must be left to implication and
setting into motion a process by which governmental power can be continually
expanded [beyond the Constitution’s agreed-upon boundaries].” Id.
104. It must be conceded that not everyone reads the text in the same way.
Critics of the Constitution were alarmed precisely because they interpreted its
language as a compact by which the governed ceded to the federal government a
breadth of sovereignty that was coextensive with the absolute power of an
English monarch. The debate over the ratification of the Constitution reflects
these differing interpretations of the text. During the debate over ratification,
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the meaning of the text persisted in the years after ratification.
In particular, early Supreme Court opinions are notable for the
manner in which they reject the compact view and embrace the
delegation view. In Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice James Wilson gave
precedence to the sovereignty of the national community of “the
105
Chief
people” over the sovereign immunity of the state of Georgia.
Justice John Jay concurred with Justice Wilson, going so far as to
106
refer to the people as “joint sovereigns” with the states.
107
In later Supreme Court cases, such as McCulloch v. Maryland
108
and Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall espoused a
particularly expansive view of the federal sovereign power in
109
However,
contraposition to the power reserved to the states.
Marshall’s opinions in these cases were premised on his
determination that the federal government was acting within the
110
delegated spheres of authority envisioned by the Framers.
Marshall frustrated attempts to subordinate federal sovereignty to
state control, but his opinions left the sovereignty of the people
111
Many of these early cases were argued before the
unscathed.
Court by Daniel Webster, who drew on Madison’s and Hamilton’s
writings in order to dispute the idea that the United States was a
112
Webster agreed with James
“compact” among sovereign states.

Federalists argued against the inclusion of a bill of rights, promising that
federal power would be interpreted narrowly under the text. See MOORE, supra
note 48, at 105–06. Anti-Federalists called for a bill of rights precisely in order
to minimize any possibility that the original text would be read to create a
federal government of vast powers. Id. at 106. With the birth of political
parties in the decades after ratification, both sides switched positions. Under
President John Adams, many Federalists became advocates of an expansive
interpretation of federal power, effectively adopting the interpretation of the
Constitution’s language that the Anti-Federalists had used to justify their
opposition to the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Anti-Federalists reemerged as
Jeffersonian Republicans who now asserted a reading of the constitutional text
premised on the assumption that the document only delegated limited authority
to the national government. Id.; see also CORNELL, supra note 74, at 164–68.
105. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453–57 (1793). The decision
of the Supreme Court was superseded by the Eleventh Amendment, which
limited federal court jurisdiction in cases in which states are a party. See READ,
supra note 14, at 106; Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v.
Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1737–38 (2007).
106. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479 (Jay, C.J., concurring).
107. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
109. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 337–53.
110. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
111. “The government of the Union . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a
government of the people. . . . Its powers are granted by them . . . and for their
benefit.” McCullough, 17 U.S. at 404–05; see also NEUMAN, supra note 12, at
60–61 (discussing Marshall’s resistance towards interpretations of the
Constitution as a compact).
112. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 78–79; GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT
GETTYSBURG 129–33 (1992). Webster also served as a United States Senator,
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Wilson that the United States was a single nation from the moment
of revolution, before the individual states even existed as separate
113
political entities.
The influence of the delegation view can also be seen beyond the
opinions of the Supreme Court. Justice Joseph Story, in his
influential book Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, adopted and expanded on the anticompact ideas of John
114
Delegation ideas also influenced
Marshall and Daniel Webster.
115
early states’ rights advocates such as John Taylor of Caroline.
Later in our nation’s history, Abraham Lincoln’s legal argument
that the secession of the Confederate states was unconstitutional
116
reflected the influence of both Daniel Webster and Justice Story.
Lincoln’s argument against secession is premised upon the idea that
the nation was formed by the people as a whole upon independence
from Great Britain, rather than by the states via a constitutional
117
As a consequence, Lincoln believed that only the people
compact.
acting as a whole nation possessed the power to dissolve the
118
Indeed, an argument can be made that throughout
union.
American history it has been the delegation view that has prevailed
whenever there was a major struggle “to determine what kind of a
119
country the United States would be.”
Therefore, the delegation view derives its legitimacy as a means
of interpreting the constitutional text from the fact that it vindicates
the original conception of the sovereignty of the federal
120
Enforcing a textual limit on the power of the federal
government.
government to exercise nondelegated powers is consistent with the
Framers’ intention to preserve the ultimate sovereign power in “the
people.” Recognizing that all humankind can object to overreaching
and his most famous speech in the Senate was a rebuke of the compact theory of
the Constitution. See Daniel Webster, Second Reply to Hayne, (Jan. 26, 1830),
in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: SPEECHES AND FORMAL WRITINGS 1800–
1833, at 284, 330–31 (Charles M. Wiltse ed., 1986).
113. See READ, supra note 14, at 110; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–33.
114. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 384–85; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–
32. See generally JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 221–72 (5th ed. 1994).
115. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 57–58; Barnett, supra note 105, at
1735–36.
116. See Michael Lind, Preface to Daniel Webster, The Second Reply to
Hayne, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note 16, at 108, 108 (noting that
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address reflects a conscious attempt to invoke the
language of Webster’s famous “Second Reply to Hayne” speech).
117. See READ, supra note 14, at 117; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–33.
118. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 246, 255 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“Our States have neither more, nor less power, than
that reserved to them, in the Union, by the Constitution—no one of them ever
having been a State out of the Union.”).
119. See Lind, supra note 16, at xiv.
120. See Barnett, supra note 105, at 1757–58.
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executive branch action, without limiting the benefits of this
approach to the members of the social contract, functions as a way of
121
policing illegitimate exercises of federal government power.
However, despite evidence that the Constitution should be read
under a delegation view, our nation’s ongoing dialogue about the
122
original understanding of the text —a dialogue that ensures that
the Constitution continues to be relevant in an ever-changing
123
world —has often favored the compact view of the Constitution
over the delegation view. Precisely how the compact view came to
predominate this debate is the subject of the next Part.
III. HISTORICAL EXPRESSIONS OF THE COMPACT VIEW
The compact view has long influenced the public understanding
of the meaning of the Constitution. It was instrumental in
arguments advanced in order to deny constitutional protections to
aliens and slaves. Its influence can also be observed in Supreme
Court jurisprudence acquiescing in the exercise of federal powers
that exceed the scope of powers delegated by the text. This is not to
say that the Supreme Court is disinclined to place limits on the
scope of federal sovereignty. However, when the Court has curbed
the scope of federal power, it has typically been in the context of
domestic controversies and in a manner that places the residual
sovereignty withdrawn from the federal government into the hands
of state governments rather than those of the people. Meanwhile,
the compact view has often been invoked to support an expansive
scope of federal power in the areas of immigration and foreign
affairs—instances when state interests are rarely directly at stake.
A.

The Framers and the Compact View

The origins of the compact view of governmental authority can
be traced to the search for a replacement for monarchy by political
thinkers in England and its colonies during the Enlightenment. By
the early eighteenth century, absolutism as the basis for the
authority of the English Crown had been undermined by the facts of
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Hanoverian reaccession to
121. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
187 (1992) (noting that the American conception of republican government
viewed state legislatures as “sovereign embodiments of the people with a
responsibility to promote a unitary public interest that was to be clearly
distinguishable from the many private interests of the society”). There are
countless examples of the Framers’ recognition that the rights embodied in the
Constitution are an expression of the universal rights enjoyed by all
humankind. For example, John Adams wrote: “That all men are born to equal
rights is true. Every being has a right to his own, as clear, as moral, as sacred,
as any other being has.” Letter from John Adams to John Taylor (1814), in THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 221, 222.
122. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 74, at 303–07.
123. See READ, supra note 14, at 169–71.
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124

the throne.
The American colonists, in particular, had begun to
think about the source of government authority in new ways that
sought to replace the patriarchal relationship between the Crown
and its subjects with a political philosophy that recognized a role for
125
Traditional notions of sovereignty
the consent of the governed.
that had long viewed the king as a paternalistic father figure began
to give way to the idea of sovereignty as a contract between the king
126
and his people.
The nature of any contract is to impose commensurate
obligations on both parties. Colonists who lived in an increasingly
commercialized world easily adapted the notion of commercial
127
The colonists’ experience with
contracts to the political arena.
commercial contracts acculturated them to the idea that positive
bargains could be “deliberately and freely entered into between two
parties who were presumed to be equal and not entirely trustful of
128
It was a natural evolution to come to view the
one another.”
relationship between the people of a nation and their government in
129
similar terms.
The colonists began to believe that, even in a monarchy, the
Crown and its subjects owe each other commensurate obligations.
The Crown owes an obligation to its subjects to protect them from
external harms and, in return, the subjects owe the Crown their
130
Colonists aggrieved by the arbitrary dictates of a distant
loyalty.
124. See WOOD, supra note 121, at 155–56.
125. MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 5–6.
126. Id.
127. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 211 (“The line between public and
private law in early national jurisprudence was plainly imprecise. So was the
distinction between private entrepreneurial activity and public welfare, at least
in
the
economically-grounded,
commonlaw-infused
constitutional
jurisprudence of [John Marshall].”).
128. See WOOD, supra note 121, at 162.
129. The compact view also displays the influence of the method of biblical
interpretation that views the Bible as a compact between God and a chosen
people. See MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 3 (“The use of
covenants to establish civil governments melded the early colonists’ religious
and legal traditions.”). The Puritan familiarity with the concept of covenants
undoubtedly contributed to the ease with which the colonists in New England
accepted a view of governmental authority premised on contractual terms. See
WOOD, supra note 121, at 163. Covenants described the relationship between
people and God, between congregations and ministers, and between members of
a religious community, so in a sense the compact view merely placed secular
authority on the same doctrinal footing as moral authority. Id. After
independence, economic forces built on this religious foundation. The need to
clarify and formalize conflicting titles to land, as well as the desire to protect
nationwide markets from localized government protectionism, meant that
“contract thinking derivative from private law . . . insinuated its way into
constitutional discourse as the chief protector of property rights.” NEWMYER,
supra note 24, at 242; accord id. at 264–66 (discussing the influences on John
Marshall’s contract law jurisprudence).
130. In 1774, James Wilson wrote that “protection and allegiance are the
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king began to view themselves as “parties to contracts, deliberative
agreements, legal or mercantile in character, between people and
131
rulers in which allegiance and protection were the considerations.”
Indeed, the moral justification for the rebellion against the Crown
that became the American Revolution was that by failing to live up
to its obligations toward the American colonies the Crown had
132
forfeited any right to expect their allegiance or loyalty.
The compact view adopts these influences and assumes a purely
contractual source of governmental authority. As applied to the
U.S. Constitution, the compact theory posits a “Genesis story” that
explains the creation of our nation. The story holds that the text of
the Constitution was created as an agreement among individual
sovereign states and that the language of the document embodies
133
Therefore, the parties to the
the terms of that agreement.
contract (the several states) remain the repository of any powers not
granted to the federal government by the text.
It is well understood that, in the debate over the ratification of
reciprocal bonds, which connect the prince and his subjects.” James Wilson,
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the
British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721, 743 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson then wrote: “Allegiance to the king and obedience
to the parliament are founded on very different principles. The former is
founded on protection: the latter, on representation.” Id. at 736–37.
131. WOOD, supra note 121, at 165.
132. MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 6–8.
133. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”). The “Genesis story”
expounded by adherents to the compact view begins with the assumption that
the Framers of the Constitution relied heavily upon the social theories of John
Locke. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION 7 (2000).
The Framers, therefore, would have expected that “the compact that establishes
and legitimizes a political society is between a prince or governing body and the
people,” and that only the failure of the compact returns the sovereign power to
the people who are then free to reconstitute a government. Id. After the
American Revolution, the thirteen former colonies were established as new
sovereigns by the popular consent of the people, and were authorized to exercise
any power not expressly forbidden by their state constitutions. Id. at 8. The
U.S. Constitution is therefore a compact between separate state sovereigns,
representing the people of separate societies. Id. at 9. The grant of power to
the federal government contained in the Constitution does not originate directly
in the people, because all thirteen state sovereigns were still in existence at the
time of ratification and the compact between the states and their residents had
never been dissolved into the state of nature that is necessary under Lockean
principles to return sovereignty to the people. Id. In sum, under the compact
view, the U.S. Constitution is a federal act performed by the several states and
not a national act performed by individuals comprising the entire nation. Id. at
19. Luther Martin, who voted against adoption of the Constitution at the
Constitutional Convention, expressed this understanding of the document as
one of his reasons for opposing ratification. See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 61–
62.
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the Constitution, those who advocated for the creation of a truly
national federal government prevailed over those who advocated for
more localized state power. However, the act of ratification itself did
little to assuage the efforts of the Constitution’s opponents.
Prominent voices continued to be raised in support of structural
changes to the Constitution that would elevate state power over its
134
When these structural changes were not
nationalist focus.
forthcoming, the opponents of nationalism switched gears: instead of
arguing that the constitutional text needed structural changes, they
argued that the text in its existing form should be interpreted as a
135
compact between the states.
Because individual persons are not a party to the agreement,
the compact view does not preserve any meaningful residual power
in the hands of the people. Under this view, “the people” are the
beneficiaries of the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution
but are otherwise spectators (albeit interested ones) at the
136
bargaining table between the states and the federal government.
One early example of the compact view being asserted in order to
interpret the Constitution took place during the debate over the
congressional statutes known as the Alien and Sedition Acts.
B.

The Alien and Sedition Acts

Under the administration of John Adams, the Federalists, who
had shepherded the nation from monarchy to independence under a
banner exalting the rights of man, had degenerated by 1798 into a
political movement that was premised on two main articles of faith.
First, the Federalists adopted measures that reflected a
fundamental fear of the people and a distrust of democracy as being
137
Second, the Federalists
incompatible with order and security.
firmly believed that opposition to their policies was premised on,
138
When
and indistinguishable from, opposition to the Constitution.
134. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 103 (“What Jefferson and Madison said
in the [Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions]—what Marshall heard with alarm—
was that the Constitution was a contract created by sovereign states and that
disputes over its meaning should be settled by those states and not the
Supreme Court.”).
135. Id. at 105.
136. Some Federalists took this argument to its logical extreme and denied
that the Constitution had any applicability to residents of the District of
Columbia or the territories. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 73–76.
137. JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 10 (1951).
138. Id. at 11. Federalist policy was motivated to a very great extent by
political considerations. As summarized by James Morton Smith:
Under the guise of patriotic purpose and internal security, the
Federalists enacted a program designed to cripple, if not destroy, the
Jeffersonian party. In the face of the emergence of an effective grassroots democratic opposition to their domestic and foreign policies, they
retreated to repression as a means of retaining political power. The
authoritarian alien and sedition system was the logical culmination of
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tensions with France created the very real prospect of war, the
Federalists reacted in a way that reflected these two basic premises.
Congress passed, and President Adams signed, the four pieces of
legislation that have come to be known collectively as the Alien and
139
Sedition Acts.
Although all four laws engendered great controversy, the Alien
Act in particular is illustrative of the development of the compact
view of the Constitution. Federalists defended the Alien Act by
arguing that aliens had no rights under the Constitution, for the
simple reason that they were not a part of “the people” who possess
rights that the federal government was obligated to recognize.
Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of State under President Adams,
expressed this view when he stated that “he must be ignorant
indeed who does not know that the Constitution was established for
the protection and security of American citizens, and not of
140
Harrison Gray Otis, one of the leading
intriguing foreigners.”
Federalists in the House of Representatives, argued that when the
drafters of the Preamble of the Constitution made reference to “[w]e,
the people,” they were referring to a discrete community of
141
This community
individuals who were parties to that document.
did not include aliens who had yet to attain citizenship. Therefore,
“[s]ince [the Constitution] was not made for the benefit of aliens,
they could not claim equal rights and privileges with American
142
These arguments clearly reflect the view of the
citizens.”
Constitution as a “compact” that only creates rights enforceable by
143
the parties to the agreement.

Federalist political philosophy.
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS 21 (1956).
139. The Naturalization Act of 1798 was intended to reduce the growing
strength of the foreign-born vote, most of which was in support of Republican
candidates, by raising the probationary period for citizenship from five to
fourteen years. MILLER, supra note 137, at 47. The Act Respecting Enemy
Aliens, passed on July 6, 1798, was a war measure, granting the power to the
President to remove citizens of enemy nations from the United States in times
of war or threatened invasion. Id. at 50. The Alien Act, passed on June 25,
1798, was directed at alien subversives whether or not the nation was at war
and without regard to whether they were citizens of an enemy or friendly
nation. Id. at 51–52. This Act granted the President the power to deport any
alien suspected of engaging in subversive activities. Id. Finally, the Sedition
Act of July 14, 1798 made it a crime to write, print, or speak in an attempt to
weaken or defame the government and laws of the United States. Id. at 66–71.
While the Naturalization Act and the Alien Act were attempts to muzzle the
Republican newspapers, many of which were founded and operated by recent
immigrants, the Sedition Act was intended by Federalists to strike at political
opposition by citizens as well as aliens. Id. at 69.
140. MILLER, supra note 137, at 164.
141. SMITH, supra note 138, at 86.
142. Id.
143. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 59 (2007); NEUMAN,
supra note 12, at 54.
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Opponents of the Alien Act premised their opposition on the
lack of any delegation of power to the Congress to legislate on the
144
The Constitution did
right of aliens to reside within the country.
not delegate a power to Congress to expel aliens any more than it
145
While the states might pass
delegated a power to expel natives.
laws governing the terms of residence by aliens, Congress could
146
The fact that Congress was acting against noncitizens did not
not.
save an unconstitutional attempt to exercise a nondelegated
147
Republican critics of the law also rejected the argument
power.
that the Constitution applied only to citizens. Representative
Edward Livingstone of New York argued forcefully that the text of
the document referred to rights possessed by “persons,” thus failing
to distinguish between citizens and aliens, and that the courts had
148
uniformly read the Constitution in this manner.
The Alien Act is significant in our nation’s constitutional history
with regard to the conceptualization of the Constitution as a
compact.
First, Federalist advocates of centralized federal
government power resorted to contractual analogies in order to
justify their suspicion of immigrants. Second, it is also notable that
this early expression of the compact view was made in conjunction
with the assertion that the federal government possessed inherent
powers of self-preservation that were not expressed in the
constitutional text. This interconnection between the compact view,
the assertion of the rights of immigrants, and the justification of a
nontextual inherent power is a persistent theme in our nation’s
149
history.

144. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 57; NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 68.
145. James Madison characterized the power to decide whether to permit
the continued residence of natives and aliens alike as “a right originally
possessed, and never surrendered, by the respective States.” Madison, supra
note 76, at 516. Federalists, in contrast, believed that the distinction between
natives and aliens was important. At least insofar as it was directed at
noncitizens, the Alien Act was said by Federalists to fall within the implied and
inherent power of the federal government to defend the country against “foreign
aggression.” MILLER, supra note 137, at 164.
146. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 57; SMITH, supra note 138, at 71.
147. SMITH, supra note 138, at 72.
148. Id. at 87. The Sedition Act eventually expired under its own terms
without being subjected to a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court
(although the Court would later characterize the Sedition Act in terms that
suggested it was unconstitutional). See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court,
the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”). The
Alien Act expired on June 25, 1800. The Naturalization Act has been amended
and superseded countless times since 1798. Alone among the four statutes
passed in 1798, the Enemy Aliens Act persists as a part of the United States
Code. 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2006).
149. Ironically, Republican opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts
responded to the threat of a centralized federal authority by advancing their
own contractual analogy. Republicans began to assert a “states’ rights” version
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Supreme Court Assimilation of the Compact View
1.

Utility of Compact View in the Defense of Slavery

The Supreme Court fully embraced the compact view in the case
150
The rationale of Dred Scott is
of Scott v. Sandford (“Dred Scott”).
a direct result of the Supreme Court’s attempt to permanently
preserve slavery despite the fact that the Constitution scrupulously
avoided choosing sides on the issue. The Court’s decision, holding
that slaves were not “persons” under the meaning of the
Constitution, claimed to do no more than give effect to the intent of
151
However, the Constitution dealt with the question
the Framers.
of slavery by leaving the institution for states to adopt or reject
152
This was the
under state law as a matter of federalism.
153
The
compromise necessary to get the Constitution adopted.
historical record does not support any specific intention on the part
of the Framers to exclude slaves from the definition of “people.”
The acceptance of slavery at the time of ratification offers no
support for the argument that the word “persons” in the
Constitution has anything less than universal application. To the
contrary, the failure to prohibit slavery actually supports a limited

of the compact view that maintained that the true parties to any constitutional
agreement were the people acting through the medium of their state
governments, a theory that reflected Republican distrust of excessive federal
power. See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 238–39. Saul Cornell summarizes this
“states’ rights” response to the Alien and Sedition Acts as follows:
Jefferson and Madison asserted that the protection of individual
liberty depended upon preserving the balance of power between the
states and the federal government. States’ rights and individual
rights continued to be linked in opposition constitutional discourse.
[The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions] also adopted the compact
theory of federalism, in which the states were cast as the original
parties of the compact that created the Union. The people acting
through the states had consented to alienate a portion of their power
to the federal government for a limited set of objectives detailed by the
Constitution. The original parties to this compact, the states, were
therefore entitled to judge infractions that violated the original
contract.
Id. at 240.
By adopting a “states’ rights” version of the compact theory, Republicans
incorporated some of the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. As an
attempt to check the growing authority of the federal government, the
Republicans’ rhetorical tactic had merit. However, by accepting the validity of
the contract analogy as a framework for constitutional interpretation, rather
than repudiating it altogether, the Republicans perversely ended up
strengthening the legitimacy of the compact view as a means of excluding
“outsiders” from the protection of the constitutional text.
150. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
151. Id. at 404–05.
152. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 424–25.
153. Id.
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delegation of sovereign power to the federal government by “the
people.” The federal government never received the power to
prohibit slavery. It was left to the states to define whether their
residents enjoyed equal protection under the law prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution was
expressly set up to preserve each state’s independent ability to
154
The original constitutional text is concerned
decide this question.
155
with the power (and lack of power) of the federal government.
The difficulty facing the majority of the Supreme Court in Dred
Scott was that the Constitution did delegate to Congress the power
156
Therefore, while reliance on the
to legislate for the territories.
delegation view might lead to the conclusion that the Constitution
offered no protection to slaves residing in the southern states, the
delegation view provided no basis for arguing that Congress lacked
the power to prohibit slavery in the territories or to make the
prohibition of slavery a condition for statehood. Unless the majority
interpreted the Constitution in a way that imposed such constraints
on Congress, the southern states would become increasingly
outnumbered by the ranks of “free states.”
The solution to this dilemma, embraced by Chief Justice Taney
and the rest of the majority, was to espouse a compact theory that
was at odds with the traditional use of delegated powers as a means
of defining the scope of federal power. Justice Taney argued that
the southern states would never have ratified the Constitution if the
157
text required the federal government to treat slaves as “persons.”
This argument reduces the Constitution to a contract whose terms
are to be defined in accord with the intentions of the parties, while
158
ignoring the interests of nonparties to the agreement.
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
159
The Fourteenth
order to overturn the Dred Scott decision.
Amendment mandated equality of all persons under the law of the
states, thereby fundamentally restructuring relations between
federal and state governments. States were no longer free to define
who enjoyed equal treatment. The sovereign “people” of the nation
reclaimed from the states the broad authority that states previously
wielded to discriminate among classes of state residents. The
Fourteenth Amendment definitively rejected the definition of
personhood propounded in Dred Scott, and this rejection should
160
No longer could the
have put the compact theory to rest.
154. See id. at 434 (concluding that John Marshall’s theory of federalism
“deferred to the states on the question of slavery”).
155. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247
(1833).
156. Scott, 60 U.S. at 436.
157. Id. at 416.
158. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 61.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
160. Rejection of the compact theory does not threaten the continued vitality
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Constitution be read as a contract between certain “persons” and the
federal government, to the exclusion of others who were born within
our borders.
However, while it emphatically affirmed the equality of all of
those born within our borders, the Fourteenth Amendment did not
address or resolve the question of whether immigrants have
constitutional rights coextensive with those of citizens. Nor did it
address whether coextensive treatment should turn on whether the
immigrants entered our country lawfully or unlawfully. In addition,
the Fourteenth Amendment failed to address whether the federal
government could deliberately undercut the promise of equality of
the “persons” referenced in its text by purposefully and methodically
ensuring that questionable government conduct take place on
foreign soil. Therefore, the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution left an opening for the compact theory to reinsert
itself into the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.
2.

Compact and Immigration Law

a. External Borders Define the Parties to the Compact. The
Supreme Court would inject the compact theory into its reading of
the Constitution when it once again had the opportunity to consider

of the “states’ rights” jurisprudence that was often the Supreme Court’s focal
point during the term of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Under Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court developed a theory of states’ rights that combined a decreased
emphasis on the Fourteenth Amendment’s structural changes with a textualist
buildup of the content of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. See Barnett,
supra note 73, at 292–93. Both aspects of this states’ rights approach explicitly
rely on compact theory principles dating back to the Articles of Confederation in
order to interpret the Constitution as a compact between the state and federal
governments. The intention of the Rehnquist Court was to recognize a broad
sphere of state sovereignty that is immune from federal interference. As a
result of this line of cases, the compact theory and states’ rights jurisprudence
have become mutually reinforcing.
However, the Rehnquist Court’s states’-rights cases need not be seen as
inconsistent with the delegation theory. The federal government lacks power to
legislate in certain fields simply because the text of the Constitution reserves
certain sovereign powers to the states. There is no need to go further and make
analogies to a compact. To do so, and to premise the existence of a limitation on
federal power on the existence of a “contract” between the federal government
and the states, is to ignore the fact that “the people” in their general capacity
are also members of the “contract” (via the Tenth Amendment) and are
therefore free to use their federal representatives to act on the states. A better
reading is simply to construe the Constitution as the source of all delegated
powers that the federal government possesses. The Fourteenth Amendment
changes the original text by removing a power that the states had previously
retained and by lodging a new power to police the states with the federal
government. After the Fourteenth Amendment, the states no longer possess
the power to treat their residents unequally under the law, and the federal
government is given the authority to enforce equality of treatment against
offending states.
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whether the Constitution provided any rights to “outsiders.” This
resurrection of the compact view occurred in the context of
immigration law.
In 1889, the Court decided the seminal
immigration law case commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion
161
Congress had passed a law barring the entry of Chinese
Case.
nationals into the United States. Chae Chan Ping, the plaintiffalien in the case, argued that Congress could not pass laws
regulating the entry of noncitizens because the Constitution did not
162
The premise of his
expressly grant such a power to Congress.
argument was that the Constitution leaves it to the individual
163
states to regulate immigration of persons across their borders.
The premise of the argument put forth by Chae Chan Ping was
identical, therefore, to the delegation view of the Constitution put
forth by the opponents of the Enemy Aliens Act. Significantly, if
Congress lacked the power to prohibit the entry of Chinese persons
into our country, it would be irrelevant whether the person objecting
to Congress’s authority was a noncitizen. It would be equally
irrelevant that the aggrieved person was physically located outside
of our borders, seeking permission to enter. However, in The
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court upheld the
164
constitutionality of the statute barring Chae Chan Ping’s entry.
Justice Field’s opinion for the Court’s majority held that
Congress does indeed possess the power to exclude noncitizens from
our borders. Three possible interpretations of the Constitution
(which is silent on the question of immigration) can be advanced to
support his holding. First, Justice Field explicitly argued that the
locus of the federal government’s immigration power lies outside of
165
Obviously,
the Constitution, in the sovereign power of nations.
this interpretation is problematic. While occasionally invoked by
166
the Supreme Court during its history, the idea that the federal
government derives any authority from sources outside of the
167
constitutional text has been criticized by legal scholars.
161. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
162. Id. at 603.
163. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–84 (1993) (demonstrating that state
laws served the function of regulating immigration during the first century of
American independence).
164. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
165. Id. at 604.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) (observing that “the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution”).
167. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis
of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 489 (1946) (“Certainly
institutions operating in crisis situations may be forced to exercise powers
beyond their announced authority. That, however, would not support a

W05_FALLONE

1100

10/18/2010 11:45:59 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Second, Justice Field suggested that the Constitution contains
an “implied” delegation of foreign affairs power to the federal
government, and that immigration falls within the scope of this
168
This second interpretation of the Constitution
implied delegation.
is similarly problematic. Even if a “foreign affairs power” might be
implied from the structure of the constitutional text to reside in the
federal government, the most logical recipient of a foreign affairs
169
Most
power would be the executive branch, rather than Congress.
of the responsibility for dealing with foreign nations is explicitly
delegated by the Constitution to the federal government in the
170
person of the President.
However, there is a third possible interpretation of the
Constitution lurking beneath Justice Field’s holding that Congress
can pass the exclusion law at issue—albeit one that Justice Field
himself does not articulate. Arguably the compact view supports the
exclusion law at issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case to a greater
extent than do the first two rationales, because constitutional limits
on government power do not apply to nonmembers. Noncitizens
located outside of our territory are simply not part of the bargain
embodied by the constitutional text. This third rationale employs
territorial borders to define the members of the “community” who
are entitled to avail themselves of the constitutional bargain.
The possibility that the compact view provides an unexpressed
rationale in The Chinese Exclusion Case was furthered in a
171
subsequent case. Fong Yue Ting v. United States extended and
expanded on what has come to be called the “plenary power
doctrine” in immigration law, a much-criticized exception to the
prevailing view of constitutional limits on federal authority. In that
case, Congress passed a law providing for the deportation of Chinese
nationals in the United States who could not establish their lawful
172
Just as the Constitution is silent as to whether
presence.
Congress has the power to pass laws excluding foreigners, the
Constitution is also silent as to whether Congress possesses the
power to order the deportation of noncitizens within our borders.
The opinion of the majority of the Court upheld the power of
conclusion that it was the theory on which the institutions operated.”). But see
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 8–11 (2005) (arguing that the
constitutional text reflects eighteenth century concepts of sovereign power, and,
in doing so, justifying a theory of executive power that is derived from political
philosophies external to the text).
168. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 605.
169. Indeed, the very congressional statute that barred the plaintiff from
entering the United States in the The Chinese Exclusion Case was passed in
contravention of guaranteed rights of reentry that had been acceded to by the
executive branch in a treaty with China.
170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the right to make
treaties).
171. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
172. See id. at 699 n.1.
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Congress to pass deportation laws, relying on the first and second
rationales expressed in Justice Field’s opinion in The Chinese
173
Exclusion Case.
Justice Field wrote a vigorous dissent in the Fong Yue Ting
case. In light of his prior opinion for the majority in The Chinese
Exclusion Case, Justice Field’s refusal to join the majority in
extending that case’s rationale to the deportation context seems
anomalous. Justice Field is clear that he fully stands by his two
earlier assertions that the power to regulate immigration is, in fact,
a legitimate extraconstitutional sovereign power, and, in any event,
that the Constitution impliedly delegates the power to regulate
immigration to the federal government as a type of “foreign
174
Why, then, does he draw a distinction between the
affairs.”
congressional power to exclude and the congressional power to
175
deport?
Justice Field’s two opinions can be reconciled if he is, in fact,
using the compact view as a filter through which to define the rights
of aliens. If the members of the “political community” entitled to
assert the protections of the Constitution are defined on a territorial
basis, then those immigrants who are present within U.S. borders
are a part of the community in a way that those aliens outside of our
borders are not. The Constitution must leave it to the states to
regulate the deportation of their residents, because the Constitution
does not grant a deportation power to Congress. Deportation,
therefore, implicates questions of membership in the state that are
not implicated by exclusion.
The majority of the Court, however, chose to define the relevant
community differently than did Justice Field.
The majority
considered noncitizens to be present within our borders at the
pleasure of Congress, and it denied the existence of any
constitutional command for Congress to treat noncitizens fairly if
176
For the majority, therefore, the presence
they are to be expelled.
of Fong Yue Ting within our borders was not presumptively
sufficient to bring him within the constitutional compact.
Significantly, however, the majority did not rely on a compact
rationale in deciding the case. Instead, the rationale of the Fong
Yue Ting majority builds on the holding of The Chinese Exclusion
Case to hold that the immigration power is founded on the sovereign
173. Id. at 705–07.
174. Id. at 745–46 (Field, J., dissenting).
175. It is also possible that Justice Field was operating under the
assumption that the Constitution does not delegate any power to the federal
government that is not sanctioned by international law. Justice Field’s brother
was the author of a well-known international law treatise that argued, among
other things, that there was no right under international law for one nation to
expel the citizens of another nation without special cause. See KANSTROOM,
supra note 143, at 97.
176. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731.
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power of nations, with the result that it largely immunizes
congressional statutes dealing with immigration matters from the
standard judicial review that the Supreme Court otherwise applies
to acts of Congress in order to ensure that statutes do not transgress
177
As a result, fundamental
the confines of the Constitution.
questions of membership are left unanswered by these two
immigration cases.
b. The Interior Remains Borderless. During the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, the conflict between the delegation
theory and the compact theory did not seem to play a major role in
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional rights outside
of the immigration context. The Supreme Court advanced the view
that all persons located within the United States, without regard to
alienage or citizenship, had an equal claim to assert the individual
178
The equality of rights
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
promoted by the Court during this period can be justified under
either a delegation lens or a compact lens. Under a delegation view,
the federal government lacks the power to infringe on the protected
sphere of individual rights. With the exception of matters relating
to admission or expulsion of aliens, which were considered to fall
within the plenary power doctrine, the compact view regarded all
persons within the territory of the United States—whether citizen,
lawful permanent resident, or illegal entrant—to be members of the
community entitled to constitutional protection. The congruence
between the delegation view and the compact view during the
nineteenth century was possible because the nation’s territorial
boundary was assumed to mark the dividing line between members
of the political community and those “outsiders” who lacked the
ability to complain if Congress overstepped its bounds.
179
demonstrates the
The decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Supreme Court’s acceptance of the inclusive nature of the rights
guaranteed to all individuals physically located within the national
boundary. The Court’s holding applied the command of equal
protection under the law set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to
177. This anomalous characteristic of immigration law has come to be
known as the plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law,
that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it
may see fit to prescribe.”).
178. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens . . . . These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.”).
179. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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180

strike down a state law that discriminated against noncitizens.
Similarly, in Yamataya v. Fisher, the Court held that the
constitutional guarantee of due process applied to noncitizens
181
In the case of Wong Wing v.
present within our nation’s borders.
182
United States, the Court took the clearest stand in support of this
principle:
[T]he Supreme Court in Wong Wing held that constitutional
rights protected unlawfully present aliens even against the
exercise of Congress’ power to control immigration. For the
first time in its history, the Court expressly invalidated a
federal statute for violating the constitutional rights of an
alien. And it did so despite the government’s argument that
unlawfully present aliens should not be recognized as
183
possessing constitutional rights.

Until World War II, therefore, the principle that all persons
located within our nation’s borders were entitled to equivalent
184
The Court’s commitment
rights appeared to be firmly established.
to this principle would be called into question, however, as it moved
to apply the compact view to limit the applicability of the
Constitution within our nation’s interior.
3.

The Compact View Moves into the Interior

As America entered the Cold War era, the Supreme Court
decided a series of immigration cases that invoked the plenary
power doctrine and that drew on the compact theory to deny the
reach of the Constitution outside our borders. These Cold War cases
made clear that the underlying rationale beneath the plenary power
doctrine was not judicial deference to Congress’s exercise of an
implied foreign affairs power, but instead the more aggressive
assertion that the federal government possesses the unbounded
power to take any action that it chooses against nonmembers of the
compact.
For example, in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, the Court ruled that the German bride of an
American soldier could be prevented from making her initial entry

180. Id. at 369.
181. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).
182. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
183. Gerald L. Neuman, Wong Wing v. United States: The Bill of Rights
Protects Illegal Aliens, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 31, 40 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds., 2005).
184. Even Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which
notoriously upheld the constitutionality of the internment of JapaneseAmerican citizens during World War II, accepted the premise that all persons
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protections of the
Constitution. Id. at 223–24. The Korematsu Court was simply not brave
enough, during wartime, to follow this premise to its logical conclusion and rule
the internment unconstitutional.
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into the country without any explanation and with virtually no
185
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
opportunity to be heard.
Mezei, the Court held that the same unfettered government power
could be applied to prevent the reentry of a lawful resident alien of
186
These cases
long standing who was returning from a trip abroad.
suggested that the federal government could take actions against
persons outside of our borders who might well be considered to be
members of the political community had they merely been present
on U.S. soil.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the rationale adopted in
these Cold War immigration cases would be extended to exclude
persons located within our borders from the “community” entitled to
187
This extension can be observed in
assert constitutional protection.
cases that considered whether unlawful border crossers located
within the United States were entitled to the same constitutional
protections as citizens. The same process can be seen in cases in
which the Supreme Court has questioned whether even lawful
immigrants within our borders should enjoy constitutional rights
identical to those that citizens enjoy.
a. Unlawful Border Crossers.
In the second half of the
twentieth century, the federal courts began to struggle with the
question of whether illegal aliens subjected to state discrimination
possessed constitutional rights. The plenary power doctrine as it
had developed in immigration cases was inapposite to the exercise of
state power, and therefore the plenary power of Congress provided
no support for the challenged state laws. However, the Supreme
Court was not willing to ignore the illegal status of alien residents
when considering the extent to which the Constitution protected
them. The result was a series of cases in which illegal aliens
received some constitutional protection from discriminatory state
188
The Court’s struggle
laws, but for reasons that were unclear.

185. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as
an alien denied entry is concerned.”).
186. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
187. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862–63
(1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s immigration and deportation rulings for
ignoring the fundamental protections accorded by the Constitution). Professor
Henkin argued that the plenary power cases should be brought into the
constitutional mainstream. Id. In fact, it is the mainstream that has been
influenced by these outlier cases.
188. For example, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) prevents states from denying public education to minor illegal aliens
within our borders, but does not posit a convincing rationale. Id. at 210.
Accord Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1971) (holding that an
alien “is a ‘person’ for equal protection purposes,” and extending to resident
aliens the same public assistance benefits enjoyed by citizens).
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reflects an unsuccessful attempt to integrate the extraconstitutional
dimension of the plenary power doctrine within the normal
189
constitutional framework.
It is difficult to reconcile the lack of constitutional rights outside
of the border with the guarantee of full constitutional protection
within the border. The reason for the Court’s struggle to maintain
this distinction is that an illegal entrant has no greater moral or
political status by virtue of evading a border checkpoint than he had
when he stood outside of our borders.
Moreover, it seems
incongruous to deny the existence of constitutional due process
rights of lawful residents who seek to reenter the United States
after a trip abroad, yet recognize that illegal entrants possess
constitutional rights merely because they stand on U.S. soil. When
attempting to resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court adopted the
position that crossing into the territory of the United States in
contravention of law grants the entrant some, but not all, of the
190
protections of the Constitution.
Nothing in the constitutional text supports the idea that
different populations within our borders are entitled to different
levels of constitutional protection. However, practical necessity
requires that the expansive federal power over immigration matters
be maintained even while the justification provided for this power
by the plenary power doctrine is increasingly exposed as bankrupt.
Even though the props upholding absolute government power over
the control of immigration have been exposed as unstable, they
cannot be allowed to fall, and thus new theories were necessary in
order to buttress the federal government’s immigration power. An
increasing reliance on the compact theory of the Constitution served
this purpose, and allowed the broad power exercised by the
government outside of our nation’s borders to reach illegal entrants
191
living within our territory.
In compact theory, persons who entered our country unlawfully
enjoy the same status as persons who are physically located outside
of the United States: neither group is part of the “community” that
is part of the bargain with the federal government. Because the
plenary power doctrine is tied to extraconstitutional notions of
sovereignty, it cannot grow to encompass legislation outside of the
immigration context unless the Supreme Court were willing to adopt
a very expansive view of the types of legal disputes that fall within
the “immigration” field. On the other hand, the compact theory of
the Constitution has room to grow outside of the immigration
context. All that is necessary is to shift away from the territorial
boundary as the exclusive determinant of who belongs to the
189. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1137–41 (1994).
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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political community and instead to become more selective regarding
the groups within our borders who qualify for membership.
192
decided in 1990, made
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
explicit the expansion of the compact view into the interior of our
country. The case involved a Mexican national who was transferred
193
While he was in
to U.S. custody by the Mexican government.
custody in California, agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency
194
Mr. Verdugosearched his home in Mexico without a warrant.
Urquidez sought to have the results of the extraterritorial search
suppressed on the grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights had
195
been violated.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court,
although his reasoning was only fully adopted by three other
Justices. He concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not protect
196
He based this
the defendant and that the search was lawful.
conclusion on the assertion that the words “the people” in the
Fourth Amendment referred to a specific community of persons who
197
Chief Justice
possess cognizable ties to the United States.
Rehnquist reasoned that aliens within our borders do not acquire
full constitutional protection until they develop sufficiently
198
Although his
demonstrable ties with the political community.
reasoning was intended to limit the reach of the Constitution to
199
who object to government
aliens outside of the United States
conduct occurring outside of our borders, Rehnquist’s rationale
applies equally to limit constitutional rights for illegal entrants
inside the United States. Therefore, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision
raised the prospect that residents who are present in the United
States in violation of the law can be excluded from “the people” who
200
can claim the protections of the Constitution.
The legislative and executive branches of the federal
192. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
193. Id. at 262.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 263.
196. Id. at 274–75.
197. Id. at 265. The First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments also
reference “the people.”
198. Id. at 271.
199. Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the United States was involuntary,
and did not confer any greater rights on him than he would have possessed had
he remained in Mexico.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1265–66 (D. Kan. 2008) (holding that an aggravated felon deported from the
United States has no Fourth Amendment rights upon illegal reentry); United
States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to those illegally present in the
United States), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004). But see United States v.
Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534 PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31652, at *14–15 (D.
Utah Dec. 6, 2005) (reading Esparza-Mendoza narrowly to apply only to alien
felons who are illegally present in the United States).
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government seem to have accepted the implications of the VerdugoUrquidez case. In 1996, Congress amended the immigration laws to
create expedited removal procedures at border crossings for aliens
who lack proper documentation, procedures that operate to remove
aliens under streamlined proceedings and without the benefit of a
201
The 1996 legislation also granted the Attorney General
hearing.
202
In 2004,
the authority to expand the use of expedited procedures.
the Department of Homeland Security announced that it was doing
just that. The new policy permits the deportation of non-Mexican
aliens apprehended inside the United States, without a hearing, so
long as their apprehension occurred within one hundred miles of the
U.S. border and less than fourteen days after the alien’s illegal entry
203
In this manner, a lesser form of due process
into the country.
rights has migrated from the border to the interior. It is no longer
the location of the alien, but the illegal manner of his or her entry,
that allows the federal government to act against the alien free from
the full measure of restraints that the Constitution otherwise places
on the exercise of government authority.
b. Lawful Border Crossers. Even those who enter our borders
lawfully can lose their membership status and therefore lose the
protection of the Constitution. Congress has adopted procedures
such as mandatory detention prior to a hearing, expedited hearings,
and limited judicial review—originally limited in application to
illegal entrants—that are now regularly applied to lawful border
crossers who commit a criminal violation after they enter the United
204
In particular, Congress’s creation of the “aggravated
States.
felon” provisions of the immigration laws fostered the application of
205
These provisions
extraterritorial norms to lawful border crossers.
operate to substantially reduce the procedural rights possessed by
those who are deemed to fall within the perpetually expanding
definition of an “aggravated felon.” In rejecting constitutional
challenges to these provisions, the Supreme Court has equated those
who enter lawfully but subsequently commit a violation of the civil
206
or criminal law with those who have entered our country illegally.
The Court initially expressed some discomfort at this prospect

201. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 422, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270–72 (1996).
202. Id. § 504, 110 Stat. at 1260–61.
203. See Fact Sheet: Arizona Border Control Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press
_release_0520.shtm.
204. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 10–12.
205. See id. at 227–28 (discussing the expanding definition of the
“aggravated felon” category between 1988 and 1994).
206. Id. at 227–28 (“[T]here has been a recent expansion—deep onto U.S.
soil—of internal deportation mechanisms that were originally envisioned as
appropriate only at the border and points of entry.”).
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207

when it decided the case of Zadvydas v. Davis in 2001. Kestutis
Zadvydas immigrated to the United States from a displaced persons
208
As a resident alien, he built a long
camp at the age of eight.
criminal record ending with a cocaine distribution conviction that
rendered him deportable after he finished serving his criminal
209
However, given the circumstances of his birth, Mr.
sentence.
Zadvydas did not possess citizenship in any other country, and the
United States was unable to identify a country willing to accept him.
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that
a removal order must be effectuated within ninety days, the INA
also provides that the Attorney General can determine that certain
210
The
aliens “may be detained beyond the removal period.”
government asserted that this provision allowed it to detain Mr.
Zadvydas indefinitely while it continued in its fruitless efforts to
211
Mr. Zadvydas filed a writ
identify a country willing to accept him.
of habeas corpus challenging his detention on the grounds that the
Fifth Amendment did not permit the government to detain him for
212
an indefinite period.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that it would raise
constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amendment to interpret
INA section 241(a)(6) as granting the Attorney General the power to
indefinitely detain individuals who were not deemed to be either a
213
The doctrine of
danger to the community or a flight risk.
substantive due process requires that government action to deprive
an individual of liberty must have a purpose, and, in the absence of
any country willing to accept Mr. Zadvydas, the government could
not identify any purpose served by continued detention. Justice
Breyer strongly rejected the government’s argument that the Fifth
Amendment’s constraints did not apply to government action
directed against aliens residing within our borders, distinguishing
precedent that denies constitutional protections to aliens as solely
applicable to the situation of aliens who have not entered the
214
Given the “constitutional
territorial borders of the United States.
problem” that would arise if the statute were interpreted to permit
indefinite detention, Justice Breyer held that the language of INA §
241(a)(6) should be read to authorize detention beyond ninety days
only so long as the removal of the alien is “reasonably
215
foreseeable.”
207. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
208. Id. at 684.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
(Supp. V 1994)).
211. Id. at 689 (majority opinion).
212. Id. at 686.
213. Id. at 690.
214. Id. at 690–96.
215. Id. at 701.
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Justice Scalia dissented. He viewed Mr. Zadvydas’s situation
through the lens of the compact view. Under this view, once an
alien is convicted of a crime and becomes deportable as a
consequence, that alien is no longer part of the community of “the
216
Instead, such an alien stands in the exact same relation
people.”
to the United States as does an alien outside of our borders. The
result is that Mr. Zadvydas, even though he stood on U.S. soil, was
simply beyond the reach of the United States Constitution.
Therefore, under Justice Scalia’s reasoning, Congress was perfectly
free to grant the Attorney General the power to order Mr. Zadvydas
217
to be detained for years, decades, or until he dies.
When the Supreme Court next considered the due process
218
rights of noncitizens, in the case of Demore v. Kim, the Court
limited the holding of Zadvydas to the point of nonexistence. Mr.
Kim immigrated to the United States from Korea at the age of six
and became a permanent resident alien. As an adult, he was
219
These convictions fell
convicted of burglary and petty theft.
within the definition of “aggravated felonies,” and in INA section
236, Congress provided that all aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies must be taken into custody and detained during the
220
Mr. Kim challenged his
pendency of their removal hearings.
detention under the doctrine of substantive due process. He argued
216. Id. at 702–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. While written in broad language that clearly invoked constitutional
concerns as a backdrop for the Court’s interpretation of INA § 241(a)(6), the
majority in Zadvydas was careful to cast its opinion as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The Court would later be asked to construe the applicability of
INA § 241(a)(6) in the context of aliens being detained as inadmissible at the
border. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), Justice Scalia wrote a
majority opinion in which he delighted in interpreting the statutory language to
require that new arrivals with no connection to the United States be given the
same relief from indefinite detention as aliens detained in removal proceedings
who have longstanding ties to this country. Id. at 378. Justice Scalia argued
that consistency in construing the statutory language requires a parallel
interpretation. In his view, the “absurd” result of forcing the government to set
loose illegal entrants pending their removal hearing if they cannot be removed
within ninety days merely underscores the mistake the majority made in
Zadvydas when it interpreted the statute to grant noncitizens rights that
approach those accorded to “the people” by the Constitution. Id. at 378–79.
Noncitizens outside of the border can often make claims of membership that are
equally as compelling as the claims of noncitizens within the border. In Scalia’s
view, the fact that aliens outside of our borders cannot be considered members
of the community governed by the Constitution dictates that aliens within our
borders must also be outside of the national compact (at least once they commit
a criminal offense that renders them deportable). If the Zadvydas majority has
foolishly construed the statute to treat deportable aliens as members of the
compact, then it has no choice but to accept the consequence that the statutory
language accords equal treatment to aliens detained at the border. Id.
218. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
219. Id. at 513.
220. See id. at 513–14.
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that the federal government had to have reason to detain him while
221
If he could show that he was
he awaited his deportation hearing.
not a flight risk, nor a danger to the community, then the Fifth
Amendment required that he be released on bond until his hearing
date.
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
disagreed. Significantly, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion treated Mr.
222
Therefore, the only
Kim as having “conceded” his deportability.
true issue was the discretion of the government in adopting
procedures to effectuate his eventual removal. In the view of the
majority, mandating the detention of whole categories of persons
during this process did not implicate constitutional concerns because
these persons had already ceased to be part of the national
223
The Fifth Amendment simply placed no constraints on
compact.
the procedures that Congress chose to employ. Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion adopts the same compact view of the Constitution
as did Justice Scalia’s dissent in Zadvydas.
The dissenters in Kim did not agree that Mr. Kim had conceded
his deportability, and therefore they did not view him as having
forfeited the protection of the Constitution. Even conceding that Mr.
Kim had no defense to his ultimate removal from the country, the
discussion of the Fifth Amendment in the Zadvydas case led the
dissenters to argue that all governmental restrictions on the
224
However,
individual liberty of noncitizens must have a purpose.
the argument that the Constitution governs all government action
within our borders, without regard to the identity of the individual
subjected to that action, was unavailing. The majority opinion
avoided the implications of Zadvydas by limiting that case to the
situation of an alien who is detained after the entry of a removal
order and whose removal is no longer practically attainable. Very
few cases will arise within this limited factual context.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the alien in Kim serves to
strengthen the application of the “compact” view within our borders.
The Court’s decision suggests that a noncitizen who entered the
country lawfully, but then commits a crime not only suffers the legal
consequence of deportation but also loses any claim to be a member
of the nation’s political community. The alien’s criminal conviction
(in conjunction with the fact that Congress has declared that those
convicted of “aggravated felonies” are automatically deportable) is
sufficient to justify treating the alien as an “outsider” with no
greater constitutional rights than those afforded to a foreigner
225
Mr. Kim’s criminal conviction acted to expel him from the
abroad.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 522–23.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
While the opinions in both Zadvydas and Kim frame their holdings as
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community of “the people.” He therefore lost the right to demand
that the federal government act in compliance with the limits
imposed on it by the substantive due process clause of the Fifth
226
Amendment.
Congress can presumably identify whole categories of
individuals and declare that they are no longer in privity with the
federal government. For example, the Kim case implies that
engaging in conduct defined as constituting an “aggravated felony”
terminates an alien’s membership in the constitutional compact.
Once excluded from the compact, an individual loses the ability to
use the Constitution to protect himself from government action. Of
course, if Congress can create one legal category that terminates
membership in the constitutional compact, then Congress can create
two, three, or a dozen other legal categories that can be applied with
similar effect. The majority in the Kim case was apparently
untroubled by the prospect that Congress might abuse this power.
D. Contemporary Executive Branch Expression of the Compact
View: The Unitary Executive
Questions of national security, like efforts to control the flow of
immigrants, provide a fertile ground for compact-based theories of
constitutional interpretation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
compact theory underlies the “theory of the unitary executive,” the
primary legal justification put forth by the Bush administration to
support its expansive exercise of executive branch power in response
to the threat of terrorism. A brief summary of Bush administration
policies is necessary in order to illustrate this connection.
The first legislative response to the attacks of September 11,
227
2001 was the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).
Under the terms of the AUMF, Congress authorized the President
“to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those
responsible for the September 11 attacks and anyone harboring
228
President Bush invoked the AUMF when he
those individuals.
issued a military order providing for the detention and treatment of
individuals taken into custody as a result of the United States’
response to the terrorist attack, and providing for the use of military
229
Although
commissions to hold trials and determine punishments.
interpretations of congressional statutes, the Court has a history of using
statutory analysis as a surrogate for constitutional interpretation in
immigration cases. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
100 YALE L.J. 545, 560–64 (1990).
226. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 224 (2003) (noting the difference in the
due process rights accorded to foreign nationals within our borders).
227. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
228. Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
229. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
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the original order did not use the phrase, the Bush administration
adopted the term “unlawful enemy combatant” to refer to those
individuals taken into custody by the United States government as
230
part of the “War on Terror.”
Although the concept of “preventative detention” is alien to our
Constitution, the legal rationale used to justify the creation of the
military commissions was that an unlawful enemy combatant had
231
These individuals
no rights under the United States Constitution.
could be held and interrogated for however long the government
considered them to either possess useful intelligence or pose a future
threat to the United States. In addition, persons designated as
unlawful enemy combatants would not receive the procedural
safeguards applicable to trials conducted in federal court, nor would
such persons be entitled to claim the international law protections
afforded to prisoners of war. The creation of the category of
“unlawful enemy combatant” removed a whole category of
individuals from the legal protections that would normally allow a
232
person to challenge the circumstances of his detention.
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov.
13, 2001).
230. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120
Stat. 2600, 2601.
231. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled
that U.S. citizen-detainees have a constitutional due process right to challenge
their designation as an “unlawful enemy combatant.” Id. at 533. In response to
this decision, the Department of Defense established bodies called Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”) that were intended to hear challenges to
enemy combatant designations by all detainees, whether citizens or not. In
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Supreme Court held that
noncitizen detainees have the right of habeas corpus to challenge their
detention in federal court, notwithstanding the provisions of the Military
Commissions Act limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the
CSRT procedures were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
proceedings. Id. at 2262–63. By focusing on the content of the right of habeas
corpus under the Constitution, the Court avoided consideration of whether
noncitizen detainees possessed the constitutional right of due process. See id.
at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, the extent to which the
Constitution grants noncitizen detainees any rights beyond habeas corpus
remains undecided to this day.
232. In this regard, the usage of the category of “unlawful enemy combatant”
mirrored the way in which the similarly elastic category of “aggravated felon”
came to be employed under the immigration laws. See supra notes 205–06 and
accompanying text. Unlike with “aggravated felons,” however, the category of
“unlawful enemy combatant” has the potential to include citizens as well as
noncitizens. See YOO, supra note 85, at 131. The Bush administration
originally sought to subject U.S. citizens Yasser Hamdi and Jose Padilla to the
military tribunal process, before retreating in the face of adverse judicial
rulings. See COLE, supra note 226, at 3–4, 43–45. While employed by the Office
of Legal Counsel, John Yoo made the argument that American citizens working
for the enemy could be treated under the Constitution as unlawful enemy
combatants, but his superiors in the Bush administration made the policy
decision to use either the criminal courts or the military courts martial in order

W05_FALLONE

2010]

10/18/2010 11:45:59 AM

CHARTERS, COMPACTS, AND TEA PARTIES

1113

The Bush administration saw its system for detaining unlawful
enemy combatants as essential to the exercise of an unfettered
choice of interrogation methods.
In the name of obtaining
intelligence in order to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil, the Bush
administration authorized a wide range of coercive interrogation
tactics: sleep deprivation; stress positions; extended exposure to
extreme heat and cold; threatened attacks by dogs; injections of
intravenous fluid while barring detainees from using the bathroom
so that they urinate on themselves; and, most notoriously,
waterboarding—a practice in which the suspect is tied to a bench,
233
Many
immersed in water, and made to feel that he is drowning.
observers have since argued that these interrogation methods
violated the United States’ treaty obligations under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
234
This Convention, ratified by
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).
Congress in 1990, prohibits the use of torture under all
235
circumstances.
to conduct trials of U.S. citizens, rather than the military commissions that
were conducting trials of Guantanamo detainees designated as unlawful enemy
combatants. See YOO, supra note 85, at 143–44; see also al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,
534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129
U.S. 1545 (2009). It is troubling to consider that the existence or nonexistence
of the constitutional procedural rights of citizens might be determined by the
policy decisions of future Presidents. It is doubtful that the Constitution was
intended to place so much power over the rights of citizens in the hands of the
executive. Cf. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 18 (“Citizens . . . may be
transformed into foreigners in order to be ostracized and banished.”).
233. Under the same preventative rationale, the Bush administration also
“disappeared” certain “high-value” suspects into “black sites” operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)—“a series of prisons in undisclosed
locations where the government’s conduct [could not] be monitored and [where]
the suspect [was] completely cut off from the outside world.” DAVID COLE &
JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 3 (2007). In other instances, when these
secret detention centers and coercive methods were not deemed sufficient, the
Bush administration “rendered” suspects to be interrogated by agents of foreign
governments that possessed even fewer scruples about their methods. Id.
234. See, e.g., id. at 34–36.
For a defense of the legality of these
interrogation methods, see YOO, supra note 85, at 165–203. For criticism of
Yoo’s reasoning, see COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 56–57. For an argument
that customary international law is not binding on the President, see YOO,
supra note 167, at 171–72.
235. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment arts. 1–7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The universality of the CAT prohibition on torture would
seem to be beyond doubt. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 55. However,
the Bush administration advanced its own interpretation of the CAT that gave
it a less than universal scope. During the confirmation hearings for Alberto
Gonzales, following his nomination as Attorney General, the question of the
applicability of the CAT to the Bush administration’s interrogation practices
arose. During those hearings, Gonzales expressed the view that the CAT did
not apply to the situation of foreign nationals outside of United States. Id. at
35; see also Opposition Statement, Human Rights First, Human Rights First
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In addition to its detention policies, the Bush administration
also responded to the September 11 attacks by embarking on an
effort to gather intelligence about al-Qaeda activities using methods
that contravened either the limits of congressional legislation or the
236
For example, while Congress responded to the
Constitution.

Opposes Alberto Gonzales To Be Attorney General 4 (Jan. 24, 2005), available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/statements/hrf-opp
-gonz-full-012405.pdf.
In putting forth this interpretation, Gonzales relied on the statutory
construction of the congressional legislation ratifying the CAT. During the
congressional debate over ratification, some members of Congress worried that
its prohibition on “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” might be
construed to limit sentencing and penal conditions within the United States,
even when those practices had been upheld by the federal courts as permissible
under the Eighth Amendments. Therefore, Congress added a reservation to the
ratification of the CAT, specifying that Congress understood the ban on “cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment” under CAT to be coextensive with
treatment that “shocks the conscience” and that violates the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments.
COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 34–35.
During his
confirmation, Gonzales argued that Congress’s reservation should be read as an
indication that the CAT did not create any enforceable rights for persons held
abroad that go beyond the scope of any Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights
possessed by foreign detainees. Id. at 35. Since the U.S. Constitution is not
generally interpreted to have extraterritorial effect, Gonzales explained,
persons held abroad have no rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, Gonzales concluded, the prohibitions on inhumane torture contained
in the CAT simply do not apply to the U.S. government’s treatment of foreigners
held abroad. Id. Clearly, Gonzales’ post hoc interpretation of the ratification
proceedings does not reflect the intention of the Senate. However, some
observers have defended the power of the executive branch to adopt and apply
its own interpretation of treaty obligations, even when that interpretation
appears contrary to the intent of the Senate. See YOO, supra note 167, at 192–
93.
After Gonzales was confirmed as Attorney General, Congress passed the
McCain Amendment in order to clarify the effect on domestic law of its 1990
CAT reservation. The McCain Amendment stated that the agents of the U.S.
government are prohibited from using cruel, inhumane, and degrading conduct
outside of the United States, and without regard to the nationality of the person
subjected to the treatment. In response, President Bush appended a “signing
statement” to the bill before signing it into law. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233,
at 35–36. In the signing statement, President Bush asserted the power to
ignore the McCain Amendment if he decided it was in the interest of the United
States to do so. In effect, the Bush administration abandoned any argument
that the scope of its authority to engage in “enhanced interrogation techniques”
was premised on an interpretation of congressional legislation passed as part of
the ratification of the CAT. Instead, the sole justification relied on by the Bush
administration for the power to ignore the terms of the CAT is that the
President has authority under the Constitution to exercise all of the powers
possessed by “the unitary executive branch,” including the power to employ any
interrogation technique that it chooses. Id.
236. See generally Bruce Fein, A Defining Constitutional Moment, WASH.
LAW., May 2006, at 35 (discussing the legality of the Bush administration’s
expanded surveillance efforts).
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September 11 attacks by passing the “USA Patriot Act,” which
broadened the government’s ability to wiretap and search
individuals without any showing of probable cause that such
238
individuals had broken any laws, the Bush administration acted
independently of Congress to implement surveillance beyond the
scope authorized by the USA Patriot Act.
President Bush
authorized a secret program to engage in wiretapping outside of the
warrant procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”), allowing the National Security Agency
239
(“NSA”) to spy on Americans without first obtaining a court order.
The Bush administration also embarked on a large-scale data
mining effort under the auspices of the NSA that intercepted and
analyzed phone records and email communications into and out of
240
the United States.
While seemingly separate undertakings, both the detention and
surveillance policies were interrelated components of one overall
strategy: the decision to expand government surveillance efforts was
directly tied to the decision to question enemy combatants free from
241
the usual checks and balances placed on government detention.
The September 11 attacks had exposed how little the U.S.
government knew about al-Qaeda and its intentions. Government
officials identified an urgent need to obtain actionable intelligence
about al-Qaeda through the interrogation of detainees, and to follow
up on leads obtained through interrogation by intercepting private
242
Therefore,
communications and data on financial transactions.
the overriding purposes behind the detention policy were forward-

237. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; see also COLE, supra note 226, at 66–68;
YOO, supra note 85, at 71–73.
238. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 31; YOO, supra note 85, at 74–75.
239. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 32. While the warrantless NSA
surveillance program authorized by President Bush started with the premise
that only extraterritorial conversations would be monitored, it eventually led to
the monitoring of some conversations within the United States. See ATHAN
THEOHARIS, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY 243 (2007). In January 2007,
the Bush administration announced that it would henceforth only conduct
wiretapping operations within the scope of congressional authorization. COLE &
LOBEL, supra note 233, at 43. In a similar example of executive branch
disregard for FISA procedures, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
improperly obtained National Security Letters on a regular basis in order to
obtain bank, credit card, and Internet information for individuals, many of
them United States citizens, without a court order. See SUSKIND, supra note 18,
at 39; THEOHARIS, supra, at 255–56.
240. See YOO, supra note 85, at 107–08.
241. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 51. As stated by John Yoo,
“Military detention is . . . one of our most important sources of intelligence,
which in turn is our most important tool in this war.” YOO, supra note 85, at
151; accord id. at 147 (discussing the benefits of military detention).
242. YOO, supra note 85, at 106.
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looking; imposing punishment for past actions that the prisoner may
or may not have taken against the United States was reduced to a
secondary concern.
While the wisdom and effectiveness of the above tactics
continue to be debated, what is undisputable is that any action
taken by the President without specific congressional authorization
243
It is not enough to argue
must have some constitutional basis.
that increased surveillance of private individuals and enhanced
interrogation of prisoners provided useful intelligence.
The
challenge facing the Bush administration was to locate a
constitutional source of authority for executive branch actions that
(paradoxically) infringed on constitutionally protected individual
rights. The answer to this dilemma was provided by a constitutional
interpretation called the “theory of the unitary executive.”
The theory of the unitary executive posits that when the
President exercises a power delegated to him in Article II of the
Constitution, he exercises that power without any limitations placed
244
As explained by John
on him by the Congress or the Judiciary.
Yoo in memos written for the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel, and later in subsequent writings, the theory of the unitary
executive holds that Congress lacks the power to “place any limits
on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the
amount of military force to be used in response, or the method,
245
According to Yoo, the
timing, and nature of the response.”
Constitution preserves these decisions for the President alone, to be
246
made without congressional interference.
At its most extreme, the theory of the unitary executive leads to
the assertion that the executive branch possesses all of the military
power that was possessed by the King of England at the time of the
American Revolution, minus whatever military power the

243. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”).
244. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First
Century: An Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008). See generally
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE (2008).
While early proponents of the theory limited its definition of executive branch
authority to the context of the President’s exclusive power to supervise and
control executive branch agencies free from congressional interference, later
proponents expanded the theory to the realm of foreign affairs. See generally
GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER 209–36 (2010).
245. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 98 (2007) (quoting Memorandum from John Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy Flanigan,
Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority To
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them
24 (Sept. 25, 2001)).
246. See id.; see also YOO, supra note 167, at 17–24.
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247

Constitution expressly grants to Congress.
The scope of executive
power is therefore defined only by the scope of the President’s
248
The logical consequence of the theory of the
responsibilities.
unitary executive is that the President would have the power to take
any action that is necessary to defend the national security of the
United States. The evidence that the Framers intended the power
of the executive branch to extend so far is slight, and there is much
249
evidence to the contrary.
The influence of the compact theory is reflected in two separate
premises that underlie the theory of the unitary executive. First,
the theory promotes the understanding of the Constitution as a
contract whereby “the people” agree to surrender certain natural
250
In other
rights to the government in exchange for their security.
words, natural rights are not inalienable but rather can be
bargained away by one generation for itself and for its descendants.
For example, John Yoo argues that the Fourth Amendment to

247. GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 97; see also United States v. CurtissWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (“As a result of the separation from
Great Britain . . . the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown . . . to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the
United States of America.”). See generally YOO, supra note 167, at 39–45
(locating the source of the broad executive branch power over foreign affairs in
the eighteenth century conception of the authority of the Crown).
248. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 79.
249. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 86, at 414, 416 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that the power of the Commander-in-Chief consists of
“nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces . . . ; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, by the
Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature”);
Reinstein, supra note 47, at 299–304 (comparing and contrasting the powers
conferred to the President by the Framers to those held by the British
monarch); accord WILLS, supra note 244, at 209–36 (criticizing both the theory
of the unitary executive and its application in legal memos written by John
Yoo).
250. For example, different arguments have been advanced that the
executive branch has a license to take whatever actions are necessary to secure
national security, without regard to the powers delegated to it by the
Constitution. Some argue that the presidential “prerogative” to act broadly in
response to a crisis is part of the original constitutional design. See, e.g., JOHN
YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND xii–xiv (2009). Others put forth Machiavellian
theories of leadership that applaud Presidents who act to further the long-term
health and safety of the populace even when they transgress constitutional
bounds. See, e.g., CARNES LORD, THE MODERN PRINCE 69–85 (2003). The
Supreme Court has considered and rejected the idea that the Constitution
grants the executive branch a reservoir of emergency powers. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–50 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think
would be wise, although it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew
what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”).
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the Constitution simply does not apply to military searches intended
251
An
to uncover al-Qaeda activities within the United States.
examination of the language of the Fourth Amendment reveals that
it does not contain any exception that limits its application during
wartime. Only one constitutional provision, the Suspension Clause,
252
A plain
provides for the limitation of rights during conflict.
reading of the text would therefore suggest that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable warrantless searches
whenever they occur within the United States. However, Yoo
argues that the protection of the right to be secure in one’s home
does not extend to “actions taken to defend the country from foreign
253
threats.”
Under Yoo’s reading, the Fourth Amendment does not express a
natural right that the federal government is precluded from
invading. Instead, the constitutional text is nothing more than a
bargain. In his interpretation, the people have agreed to surrender
rights otherwise guaranteed to them if the federal government
deems that surrender to be necessary for the protection of the nation
254
Of course, whether the nature of the threat merits
from outsiders.
this surrender, and whether the surrender is necessary in order to
respond to the threat, are determinations that Yoo leaves in the
hands of only one party to the bargain—the executive. This is a
Frankenstein view of the executive branch, one that treats it as a
creature with a life beyond the control of its creator.
The second way in which the compact view can be seen to
influence the theory of the unitary executive is that “the people” who
benefit from the constitutional bargain are defined in such a way as
to exclude any person who may pose a threat to the security of the
nation. John Yoo makes this connection explicit in his arguments
used to support an inherent presidential power to order torture and
the invasion of privacy. In his view, war is waged against foreign
255
enemies who are not a part of the “American political community.”
Therefore, the tactics employed by the executive branch during
wartime are not limited in any way by the Constitution’s framework
256
That framework,
of individual rights and separation of powers.
251. YOO, supra note 85, at 82.
252. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
253. YOO, supra note 85, at 82.
254. Yoo explicitly places military action outside of the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, calling the authority to engage in military searches
a “distinct legal regime[]” from the criminal justice system. Id. His lone
support for severing military action from constitutional constraints is a citation
to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). Under this
view, this citation makes clear the connection between the compact theory as
employed in immigration cases and its use as a legal justification for the tactics
employed in the War on Terror.
255. YOO, supra note 85, at 16.
256. See id. at 162 (“[E]nemy aliens are not part of the American political
community and do not have the same constitutional rights as its actual
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according to Yoo, only applies to the relationship between the people
257
Yoo concludes that the
and their government during peacetime.
“clear, strict rules” that delineate the limits of the power of the
federal government under our constitutional system should not be
applied to place any constraint on the form of power that the federal
258
government asserts against its enemies.
The theory of the unitary executive as described by John Yoo
operates under the assumption that unlawful enemy combatant
status renders the individual an “outsider” to the U.S. political
community and therefore that an unlawful enemy combatant is
precluded from asserting either the individual rights granted by the
Constitution or the structural limits that the Constitution places on
259
Under this theory, the executive
federal government authority.
branch alone possesses the authority to decide which individuals
260
Yoo’s explanation of the theory
receive enemy combatant status.
members.”).
257. Id. at 16.
258. Id. Yoo gives no citations in support of this interpretation. The Fourth
Circuit explicitly rejected this argument in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213
(4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009):
The Government summarily argues that even if the AUMF does not
authorize al-Marri’s seizure and indefinite detention as an enemy
combatant, the President has “inherent constitutional authority” to
order the military to seize and detain al-Marri. According to the
Government, the President’s “war-making powers” afford him
“inherent” authority to subject persons legally residing in this country
and protected by our Constitution to military arrest and detention,
without the benefit of any criminal process, if the President believes
these individuals have “engaged in conduct in preparation for acts of
international terrorism.” . . . Given that the Government has now
acknowledged that aliens lawfully residing in the United States have
the same due process rights as United States citizens, this is a
breathtaking claim—and one that no member of the court embraces.
al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 247.
259. Congress seemingly acquiesced in this broad assertion of executive
power. The legislation sought and obtained by the Bush administration as part
of its response to the September 11 attacks, such as the Patriot Act and the
Military Commissions Act, consistently sought to insulate the exercise of these
broad powers from legal challenges in three ways: by foreclosing direct review of
executive branch action in federal court; by limiting the utility of the writ of
habeas corpus to challenge government detention; and by curtailing the
procedural due process rights of suspected terrorists.
260. An accompanying benefit of outsider status (from the perspective of
those advancing this theory) is that unlawful enemy combatants do not enjoy
prisoner-of-war status under international law and therefore cannot appeal to
any alternative legal regime of human rights that might afford protection to
enemy combatants. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 110. Jack Goldsmith,
former assistant attorney general at the Office of Legal Counsel during the time
period immediately following the formulation of the Bush administration’s
policy on military tribunals and interrogation techniques, defends this result.
He writes: “The bottom line was that none of the detainees in the war on
terrorism would receive POW status or any other legal protection under the
laws of war. This was a congenial conclusion to the administration, which
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implies that the executive branch also possesses the power to police
the domestic membership of the American political community, and
could therefore adopt procedures for expelling disloyal citizens from
261
the compact.
CONCLUSION: THE DELEGATION VIEW RE-ASCENDANT
Ever since 1789, the original understanding of the Constitution
as a charter of delegated powers to the federal government has been
in conflict with a competing interpretation of the Constitution: the
view that the text should be read as a compact between the states
and between the federal government and a discrete population of
individual members. Even as academics have largely ignored the
implications of reading the Constitution in contractarian terms,
each of the three branches of the federal government has taken
actions that reflect the assumption that the Constitution should be
read as a compact. A careful examination of the choice between a
delegation view and a compact view of the Constitution is necessary,
however, because the choice illuminates the constraints placed on
the exercise of federal power.
The government’s bailouts of financial firms and automobile
manufacturers have led some observers to charge that the federal
government
has
overstepped
its
proper
bounds
and
262
Similarly,
unconstitutionally intruded into the private market.
opponents of health-reform legislation have objected to the
constitutionality of both the federal government’s exercise of
regulatory control over the market for health insurance and
imposition of an individual mandate to purchase private health
263
Unease over government actions in the War on Terror
insurance.
that impinge on personal privacy or diminish civil liberties has
combined with opposition over these government interventions in
the free market to inspire the growth of the Tea Party Movement as
264
a political phenomenon.
wanted to maintain flexibility in the face of a new type of enemy, with unknown
capacities; to interrogate detainees in a way that POW status would have
precluded; and to avoid future scrutiny under the War Crimes Act, which
basically applies only if the Geneva Conventions do.” Id.
261. See COLE, supra note 226, at 69–71 (discussing citizenship-stripping
provisions of the draft Domestic Security Enhancement Act); see also al-Marri v.
Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Neither Quirin nor any other
precedent even suggests, as the Government seems to believe, that individuals
with constitutional rights, unaffiliated with the military arm of any enemy
government, can be subjected to military jurisdiction and deprived of those
rights solely on the basis of their conduct on behalf of an enemy organization.”).
262. See Andrew Napolitano, Editorial, Unconstitutional Bailout, N.Y. SUN,
July 17, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/unconstitutional-bailout/82095.
263. See Randy Barnett et al., Why the Personal Mandate To Buy Health
Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LEGAL
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., D.C.), Dec. 9, 2009, at 1.
264. See Gerald F. Seib, Tea Party Holds Risks for GOP, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
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Criticism of these exercises of federal government authority
reflects the persistent force of the original understanding of the
Constitution as a charter. An examination of the characteristics of
the delegation view reveals why it may hold an appeal for the loose
confederation of libertarians, free-market advocates, and states’
rights proponents that comprise the Tea Party Movement. The
pendulum of popular opinion may be swinging back to the
delegation view precisely because it promotes several core
constitutional values that are not present under the compact view.
For example, one unique aspect of the delegation view is that
under a charter, the text’s grant of authority to the federal
government is policed by the entire public, not just by the narrow
universe of parties to the contract. James Madison wrote: “As metes
and bounds of government, [charters] transcend all other landmarks, because every public usurpation is an encroachment on the
265
For this reason, Madison
private right, not of one, but of all.”
considered the charter to be the supreme form of contract. Unlike
other types of contracts, which are only enforceable by the parties to
the agreement, a charter creates an interest even on the part of
266
Everyone—insiders and outsiders alike—benefits
nonparties.
when outsiders are granted the power to enforce structural
limitations on the federal government.
Another attraction of the delegation view is that, unlike the
compact view, the delegation view places primacy on the sovereignty
of “the people.” “The people” are the direct creators of the federal
government and, as such, must of necessity continue to possess any

2010, at A2.
265. Madison, Charters, supra note 67, at 508. It is because of this common
interest, shared by all citizens, in the government’s adherence to the limits of
its charter (“keeping every portion of power within its proper limits”) that
Madison believed that future citizens would be motivated to “support the
energy of their constitutional charters.” Id.
266. The implications of this different focus can be observed by comparing a
charter to the modern economic conception of a business corporation as a “nexus
of contracts.” The nexus-of-contracts view conceives of a corporation as “a web
of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the
various parties making up the firm.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION
LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (2002). In the context of corporate law, the pure
contractual view has two characteristics. First, it emphasizes the limited
universe of individuals who can claim to possess rights within the corporate
enterprise, thereby implicitly rejecting any public interest in the exercise of
those rights. Second, conceptualizing the corporation as a nexus of contracts
places a primary value on the freedom of the participants in the firm to agree to
whatever terms that they desire. The content of those terms is unimportant, so
long as those terms are expressed in the foundational corporate documents.
Certain participants in the corporate enterprise, such as board members or
majority shareholders, may even divert the economic benefits of the enterprise
to themselves, at the expense of other participants, so long as that power is
granted to them in the foundational agreement. The role of the state, in such a
system, is merely to enforce the private bargain.
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sovereign power that they did not see fit to delegate to that body. It
is not only presumptuous for the federal government to claim more
power than the Constitution grants, it is also a direct assault on the
sovereignty of the people.
Critics call this concept of popular sovereignty a fiction. They
point out that there is no mechanism under the Constitution for a
body of national “people” to meet or act—thereby leaving the federal
267
government as the de facto possessor of absolute sovereignty.
However, even if popular sovereignty is in some sense a fiction,
belief in this fiction has the practical effect of inspiring both the
public at large and government officials to behave as if “the people”
268
Political symbols, such as the
truly are the ultimate sovereign.
idea of popular sovereignty, derive their power from their tendency
269
to cause believers to modify conduct in conformity with ideals.
The delegation view of the Constitution inspires government
officials to adopt policies that subject all official action to public
270
accountability and control.
Opponents of an expanding federal presence in the economy
also likely prefer the delegation view to the compact view because
the latter facilitates the power of the executive branch to grow and
to expand beyond the powers expressly delegated to it. For example,
the theory of the unitary executive places the actions of the
267. See BERNARD CRICK, IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS 69–73 (4th ed. 1992); see
also READ, supra note 14, at 116 (“The idea of ‘the sovereignty of the people,’ if
it makes sense at all, does so only at a very high level of abstraction.”).
Nevertheless, early constitutional expositors such as Chief Justice John
Marshall believed that popular sovereignty exists in fact under the
Constitution, despite the lack of any means for it to be exercised other than
through the vehicle of a constitutional convention. See NEWMYER, supra note
24, at 345.
268. READ, supra note 14, at 116.
269. Id. (citing EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 13–14 (1988)).
Susan Neiman argues persuasively that a belief in moral ideals can transform
our reality:
In the eighteenth century the idea that even all white men were
created equal was anything but obvious; most of the world thought it
patently false. In 1776 a band of colonials had the audacity to declare
the idea self-evident—and thereby began to make it come true.
SUSAN NEIMAN, MORAL CLARITY 43 (2008); cf. GEORGE ORWELL, England Your
England, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 252, 261 (1981) (“In England such
concepts as justice, liberty, and objective truth are still believed in. They may
be illusions, but they are very powerful illusions. The belief in them influences
conduct, national life is different because of them.”).
270. The compact view fosters a lack of transparency in government. The
Bush administration was criticized for excessive secrecy and a lack of
accountability for its antiterrorism policies. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note
233, at 40–47. The expanding sphere of government information that is
classified and therefore withheld from the public has grown over the years in
direct proportion with the assertion that the Constitution grants the executive
branch an absolute power over national security matters. See WILLS, supra
note 244, at 137–40.
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President outside of congressional control. Beyond replacing the
President via election or impeachment, the citizenry is left with no
ability to employ their elected representatives in order to constrain
executive action directed at outsiders. Insofar as it acts against
“outsiders” to the Constitution, the compact view leaves the
executive branch unchained from both the delegated powers of
Article II and the structural constraints imposed by the separation
of powers.
Finally, it can be argued that the delegation view promotes a
greater regard for the protection of human rights than does the
271
This is because the unbounded power that the
compact view.
compact view places in the hands of executive branch officials is
limited only by the individual moral compasses of those officials.
For example, waterboarding and other extreme forms of
272
Observers
interrogation are viewed as immoral by many persons.
have questioned how such tactics could have been adopted as official
government policy.
One conclusion is that moral values of
individual government officials are insufficient to prevent the
adoption of morally questionable policies. “[M]ost evil is done by
people who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or
273
Government officials will always be tempted to believe that
good.”
they are “as intrinsically good as their opponents [are] intrinsically
evil,” and to assume that any policies that they adopt are morally
274
Structural limitations that prevent absolute power from
justified.
being lodged in the hands of any single government official provide
greater security for human rights than does a blind faith in the
275
The
moral compasses of the men and women in government.
delegation view was favored by the Framers of the Constitution
because it provides this very measure of security.
271. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 5.
272. The debate over the morality of torture continues to this date. See, e.g.,
Mark Oppenheimer, Catholic Defender of Waterboarding Gets an Earful from
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at A19.
273. HANNAH ARENDT, THINKING 180 (1978).
274. NEIMAN, supra note 269, at 338–39.
275. A faith in the moral compasses of individuals cannot prevent societies
from committing immoral acts. See JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY 401–04
(1999). Steven Pinker aptly summarizes Glover’s key observations:
No one is a saint, and most people calibrate their conscience against a
level of minimum decency expected of people in their peer group or
culture. When the level drifts downward, people can commit horrible
crimes with the confidence that comes from knowing that “everyone
does it.” Euphemisms like ‘‘resettlement to work camps,’’ phased
decisions (in which bombing targets might shift from isolated factories
to factories near neighborhoods to the neighborhoods themselves) and
the diffusion of responsibility within a bureaucracy can lead
conscientious people to cause appalling outcomes that no one would
ever willingly choose on his own.
Steven Pinker, All About Evil, N.Y. TIMES BK. REV., Oct. 29, 2000, at14, 14–15
(reviewing JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY (2000)).

W05_FALLONE

1124

10/18/2010 11:45:59 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

After decades during which it appeared that the compact view
of the Constitution was ascendant, it is possible that we are
currently poised on the cusp of a re-ascendance of the delegation
view. Once again, the current generation of voters is being
presented with divergent views of the original understanding of the
Constitution. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, both the
delegation and compact view of the Constitution have deep roots in
our nation’s history.
Regardless of which view captures the
imagination of contemporary voters, the public will benefit from a
debate that underscores the differences between reading the
Constitution as a charter or a compact.

